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ABSTRACT 
The Illusion of Peace: 
The Fate of the Baltic Displaced Persons, 1945-1952. 
(December 2007) 
Victoria Marite Helga Eastes, B.A., Bethel College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Arnold P. Krammer 
 
 
Following the end of World War II, the Allied forces faced an immediate large- 
scale refugee crisis in Europe. Efforts focused on returning the millions of refugees to 
their homes as quickly as possible. Though the majority did return home, nearly a million 
refugees from Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe refused to do so. Reclassified as 
Displaced Persons (DPs) and placed in holding camps by the Occupational Authorities, 
these refugees demanded that Allied leaders give them the chance to immigrate and 
resettle elsewhere. 
 Immigration historians of this period have focused mainly on the experiences of 
the Jewish refugees during the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel. Other studies 
depict the chaos in Germany immediately following the war, describing the DPs as an 
unstable factor in an already unstable situation. While important, these works tend to 
overlook the fate of non-Jewish refugees who would not return to their homes. 
Additionally, these works overlook the many immigration and resettlement schemes put 
in place to solve the DP situation and stabilize Europe, focusing instead on economic 
forces and growing Cold War tensions. 
 This thesis looks at the experiences of the Baltic DPs, those from Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia. Beginning with a brief history of the three countries and their 
 iv
people’s experiences during the war, this study also looks at their lives in the DP camps 
and explores their reasons for not returning home. It also recounts the Allies’ decision to 
promote resettlement rather than repatriation as the solution to the refugee problem by 
focusing on the immigration programs of the four main recipient countries, Britain, the 
United States, Canada, and Australia. This thesis argues that the majority of the Baltic 
DPs came from educated, middle class backgrounds and as such, they were widely 
sought after by the recipient countries as the most suitable for immigration. A final 
argument is that disagreements over their fate between the United States, England, and 
the Soviet Union, fueled the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Every home in Latvia once had a garden; it was what Latvia was famous for 
throughout the European world. Whether by a house in the city or on a farm in the 
countryside, flowers grew everywhere filling the air with their perfume and the eyes of 
passerby’s with the brightness of their colors. This was at least true according to those 
Latvians forced to flee from their homes during World War II. Before the war, there were 
gardens everywhere. But the Soviets, the Germans, and the Allies destroyed the flowers. 
These are the memories of those forced to leave their gardens behind. When something 
loved is lost, the memory of it grows stronger. 
 Similar memories survive among the refugees from the other Baltic nations who, 
along with Latvia, lost what made them unique to the world.  The Lithuanians, for 
example, remembered with fierce pride their historical independence from the cultural 
encroachment of foreign nations.1 The Estonians remembered their music and artistic 
culture they felt were lost to the brutality of the war.  For each of these countries, the 
independence of the interwar period spurred a flourishing culture and a sense of national 
pride. This pride would ultimately make the loss of their homelands following the Second 
World War that more devastating for survivors. 
 Following the First World War, the Baltic countries took advantage of the chaos 
of political and social upheaval across Europe and declared their independence as 
individual countries, separated from the control of their stronger neighbors (namely 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style and format of The Journal of American History. 
1 During the time of the Teutonic Knights, Lithuania was the last pagan nation in Europe to hold out against 
Christianity. For centuries after, they fought a continual battle against Polish encroachment into their 
physical and cultural boundaries – a battle which did not end until their declaration of independence 
following World War I.  
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Germany, Russia, and Poland).  Located along Russia’s border with the Baltic Sea, the 
Baltic countries provided a strategic location for sea trade between Eastern Europe and 
the Western World.  The capital city of Latvia, Riga, became a chief trading center for 
trade with Great Britain (which was among the first of the remaining Great Powers to 
acknowledge Baltic independence), exporting goods like butter and timber to the British 
in exchange for further trade and protection. With increasing prosperity in the region 
came a cultural flowering. Each country promoted their native languages and customs 
while actively attempting to push out centuries of foreign influence. Though there were 
struggles along the way towards independence, the Baltic countries enjoyed a relatively 
prosperous and independent interwar period, however brief. 
The events of the Second World War, however, once again placed them under the 
control of others. Thousands of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians left their homelands 
during the war with the thought of returning one day to reclaim and rebuild. The peace, 
however, did not fulfill these hopes. The Yalta Agreement, signed in the final months of 
the war by the leaders of the Allied forces – President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin – did not reinstate the 
independence of the Baltic countries, but instead granted them to the Soviet Union in 
exchange for assistance in taking Berlin and future help against Japan.  
 The terms of the agreement were a hard blow to the Baltic refugees. The felt 
betrayed by those who promised to help them. Feelings of fear, hopelessness, and 
determination quickly followed. Outrage against the Allies for so quickly forgetting their 
own promises of independence to all was common among the refugees. With little but 
righteous indignation to support their pleas for justice, the Baltic refugees did what they 
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could to survive and preserve their cultural heritage.  Refused their independence, the 
refugees in turn refused to return to their now-occupied homelands instead forcing the 
Allies to provide them with other options. 
When Germany surrendered and most of the estimated eight million wartime 
refugees began the journey back to their homes, the Soviets demanded the return of those 
they claimed belonged to the Soviet Union, including those refugees from the Baltic 
countries, as well as Poland and the Ukraine. Under the management of the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA), repatriation (whether voluntary 
or forced) was the mandate of the United Nations and the Allied forces in charge of 
controlling and providing for the refugees. Some did return, but more refused to do so. 
Stories and rumors of the mass executions and deportations of returning refugees made 
the idea of repatriation into Soviet hands a terrifying prospect. They had fled out of fear 
of communism and would not willingly return into its embrace. These refugees were 
nick-named “die-hards,” “un-repatriables” and later officially labeled as Displaced 
Persons (DPs). 
 With the ultimate failure of repatriation, the fate of the remaining refugees posed 
a serious problem for the United Nations and Allied military forces. The cost of caring 
and providing for them in DP camps established throughout Germany, Austria, and Italy 
proved a financial and physical burden on the Allied forces. Their continued presence in 
the camps created a further drain on the already burdened local economies, fostering 
hostility between them and the native populations.  Resettlement into host countries 
became the only viable option. In 1946, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) 
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replaced UNRRA and the long process of selection, placement, and immigration from the 
camps began. 
 As with any immigration scheme, organizations like the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA) and the International Red Cross (IRC) applied political pressure on 
host nations to accept immigrants on humanitarian principles. Ultimately, the 
qualifications of the DPs to meet the needs of the host countries determined their 
acceptance. As this study will indicate, the Baltic DPs were among the most sought after 
refugees in terms of resettlement. Many factors – including their high level of education, 
their ethnicity, their status as “victims” of communism, and their youth (a majority of 
those who fled were of the younger generation) – made the Baltic DPs especially 
desirable by host countries with the hope that they would easily assimilate and become 
valuable and productive citizens. By focusing on the postwar situations and recruitment 
processes of the largest host countries – the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia 
– this study will present a small part of the restructuring of the world through the 
experience of the DPs. 
Because of society’s apparent fascination with the World War II period (as 
evidenced by the thousands upon thousands of sources that analyze and discuss every 
aspect of the war and those involved), it is somewhat surprising to find that so little has 
been written concerning the immediate fate of the many millions left homeless by the war 
and its aftermath.  Most histories of the period seem to end with the dropping of the 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and begin again on the domestic front with the 
beginning of the Cold War. Arguably, the contention over the fate of the DPs was the 
first “battle” of the Cold War. 
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During the final years of the DP program, which lasted roughly from 1945 to 
1952, several published works appeared concerning the DP camps and their organization 
written by former aid workers, who (in most cases) helped to manage food and other 
provisions for the refugees. The focus of the majority of these works was to make the 
plight of the DPs known to potential sponsors for resettlement in various host countries.  
These writings largely stopped once the camps closed in 1952.Since then, histories have 
sporadically appeared over the years which deal with the handling of the refugee crisis by 
the Allied powers in charge. Of these sources the most widely known and oft-quoted is 
the work by Malcolm J. Proudfoot. Written in 1959, his study entitled European Refugees, 
1939-1952, focused on the organization and handling of the DP camps by Allied military 
forces and the United Nations, and is arguably the most prominently featured work in the 
field. 
 Recent interest from historians, however, is proving that rather than remaining an 
unimportant part of postwar history, the experience of the DPs provides an interesting 
subject through which to analyze early Cold War history. An increasingly prolific writer 
in this field is Linda McDowell. The focus of her research is on the experience of the 
European Volunteer Workers in Great Britain beginning in 1946. Published in 2005, her 
study Hard Labour is an example of the new history which attempts to explain the 
handling of the DPs as part of the larger political and social experience of the host 
countries. Another prominent historian of this topic, Michael R. Marrus, broadens his 
focus to include all European refugees from the end of the First World War through the 
Cold War. In The Unwanted, published in 2001, Marrus offers a comprehensive look at 
the refugee problem of the twentieth century as a whole. 
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 Other interests in the field concentrate on race, gender, and identity studies. 
Authors like Kathleen Paul, Colin Holme, Elizabeth Wilson, and Klaus Neumann (to 
name a few) discuss the resettlement of the DP populations in relation to the varying 
degrees of acceptance they experienced in their host countries – acceptance which 
depended largely on their ethnicity, their ability to work, and their ability to assimilate.  
The importance of the DP experience is in the insight they provide into the cultural and 
ideological beliefs of the countries that accepted them. These authors argue that the 
general assumption of the host countries was that as white Europeans the Baltic DPs 
would most easily assimilate culturally and become new and productive citizens. As will 
be discussed later, these assumptions proved unreliable as the loss of their homelands 
increased the importance for the DPs to preserve their cultural heritage and separate 
themselves from those around them. 
From the DPs themselves, information about their experiences immediately after 
the war is scarce.  When asked to relate their stories of survival, most answer that it was 
not important; they were no different from those who did not survive or who did not get 
out before the communists came.  For them, life in the DP camps was dull and boring, 
taken up with managing and rebuilding their lives as best they could with the provisions 
given them.  Their memories focus on the war years and their new lives as immigrants in 
foreign countries – the period in between is of little importance to them.  Novice historian, 
Jane E. Cunningham has written one of the few published biographies available on this 
period.  In The Rings of My Tree: a Latvian Woman’s Journey, published in 2004, 
Cunningham relates the story of her friend Mirzda Labrencis, a Latvian DP who left her 
family in Latvia and eventually resettled in the United States.  According to the author, 
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the book itself is not a history, but “the personal story of a young, working woman who 
experienced history.”2 This explanation conforms to the DP’s view that history was what 
occurred around them – they merely survived until circumstances provided them with a 
resting place. The stories of the younger generation of DPs (those who were small 
children while living in the DP camps) have proved a valuable source by providing a 
view of the day-to-day survival within the camps through the eyes of its children. 
Published in 1999 by award-winning historian Modris Eksteins, Walking Since Daybreak: 
A Story of Eastern Europe, World War II, and the Heart of Our Century, relates his 
family’s experience in the DP camps in Germany while fitting them into the larger 
historical picture of the time. 
 An abundance of primary sources on the subject are available for those with the 
ability and the inclination to find them. The annual reports of both UNRRA and IRO 
provide researchers with official statements regarding the setup, management, and control 
of the DP camps. They also include statistics of the number of refugees in the different 
camps, their nationalities, ages, and level of education, ability to work in skilled and 
unskilled occupations, marital status, and mobility.  Within the reports are included 
recommendations for handling the refugees, including references of the multiple failures 
and accomplishments of the two organizations and the Allied forces themselves. Still 
more sources, such as pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, government memos, 
interviews, and several unpublished works complete the range of sources used in this 
study. 
                                                 
2 Jane E. Cunningham, The Rings of My Tree: A Latvian Woman’s Journey (Coral Springs, FL: Llumina 
Press, 2004), 3. 
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 The relative newness of the research into this topic opens a wide array of related 
areas. Most written works about this topic deal with the refugee problem as a whole or 
how it relates to the postwar restructuring of the Allied nations on the domestic front.  As 
of yet, little research has focused on why any individual group of DPs were considered 
more desirable than others as immigrants and thus potential citizens by the available host 
countries. As will be shown, each host country established different criteria for what 
constituted desirability among the DPs recruited as immigrants. 
 The main focus of this study is the experience of the Baltic DPs in the immediate 
postwar period and to answer the question as to why the host countries singled them out, 
among all the nations represented by the refugees, as the most desirable for immigration. 
The first section will give a brief history of the Baltic countries during the war and the 
main reasons for the flight of so many from their homes during the Second World War. 
The second section will then discuss the end of the war itself, the establishment of the DP 
camps, the Allies’ initial push for repatriation as the solution to the refugee problem, and 
the instigation of resettlement schemes as a permanent solution. The following sections 
will then deal with how each of the four main recipient countries – the United States, 
Great Britain, Canada and Australia – handled the issue of resettlement by focusing on 
the postwar political and social climates of each country, their individual resettlement 
schemes, and the success or failure of those schemes based on the personal experiences 
of the Baltic DPs.  
 Mirzda Labrencis ends the story of her experience as a DP noting that: “During 
and after the war, the mysteries of life intensified for me.  Just because I survived the war 
does not mean that its effects were over. The aftereffects truly only end when death 
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comes because living though a war changes your life forever.” The DPs were victims of 
the war’s end. Peace proved an illusion, but spurred their lives into new directions.  
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CHAPTER II 
 A BRIEF LOOK AT LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA 
 On 28 November 2006, Latvia played host to the NATO summit held in the 
capital city of Riga. For the former Soviet state, along with its closest neighbors 
Lithuania and Estonia, this was an amazing event. For natives both at home and abroad 
this meeting was a proud moment which brought the events of the twentieth century full 
circle, restoring their independent status and place in the world. 
 Because of their close proximity to each other and their geographical location 
between Russia and the Baltic Sea, the three countries share a similar history and 
experience especially during the World War period of the past century.  Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania each declared their independence from the Russian Empire amidst the 
upheaval of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and President Woodrow Wilson’s 
declaration that all people should have the right to self-determination. The struggle to 
maintain that independence continued throughout the interwar period as each nation 
survived the Great Depression, the continuous threat of Communism, and the rise of 
would-be dictators among their own leadership. Throughout this period, however, each 
nation continued to thrive in terms of national pride and fierce loyalty to its cultural 
heritage. 
 By the eve of the Second World War, the threat to Baltic independence posed by 
the rapid growth of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union grew too large to ignore as both 
desired control over the Baltic’s natural resources as well as access to the Baltic Sea. 
With the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty in 1939, Baltic independence 
ended enmeshing the region in the back and forth struggle between Germany and the 
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Soviet Union. The fear and devastation brought about because of this struggle would 
define the lives of the Baltic Displaced Persons long after the war’s end.  In order to 
understand the reasons why thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians fled their 
homelands to live as refugees, a look at the history of the region is necessary. 
 Geographically located between Russia and the Baltic Sea, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania have existed in one form or another, since the Bronze Age.3 Their languages 
themselves are relics of the past, with Lithuanian considered by linguists as the closest 
living language to Sanskrit.4 Until the early Middle Ages, the pagan Baltic tribes led a 
relatively peaceful existence as traders with their Christian neighbors, neither regarding 
the other as a serious threat. Beginning in the late twelfth century, however, as the 
Christian nations of Europe grew in numbers and strength they cast covetous eyes on the 
resources and potential of the Baltic region. Overcome with religious zeal and 
disappointed with the loss of Jerusalem and failure in the Holy Land, crusaders from 
Germany began a brutal campaign to convert the last pagan tribes in Europe. In the 
northern regions, the organization of crusading knights known as the Brotherhood of the 
Sword successfully created the military state of Livonia, establishing Riga, at the mouth 
of the Daugava River, as both its religious and trading center. By the thirteenth century, 
Estonia and Livonia (now present day Latvia) came under the control of the Danes who, 
in 1346, sold their claim to the region to another religious order, the Teutonic Knights. 
The Teutonic Knights also campaigned against the Western tribes in Lithuania at the 
same time that the Brotherhood of the Sword gained control in the north, yet with less 
                                                 
3 Alfred Bilmanis, “Free Latvia in Free Europe,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 232 (March 1944): 44. 
4 Leo J. Alilunas, Lithuanians in the United States: Selected Studies (San Francisco, CA: R&E Research 
Associates, Inc., 1978), 9-10. 
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degree of success. By the thirteenth century, the Knights controlled the entire Baltic 
region and established a German cultural, social, and political hegemony that would last 
through the events of the Reformation and the chaotic sixteenth century.5 
 Over the next two centuries, the competing powers of Eastern Europe fought 
against each other to fill the power void left by the fall of the Knights. Although the 
Swedish empire gained control in Estonia, they fought continually with Russia for control 
of Livonia, enjoying brief success under Gustavus Adolphus whose period of 
administrative reform historians sometime refer to as the region’s “golden age.” In 
southern Livonia, Lithuania allied with Poland to establish the Duchy of Courland and 
later the eastern province of Latgale.6 
 The conflict finally ended in 1721 when Peter the Great, in accordance with the 
Treaty of Nystad, added Estonia and Livonia to the Russian Empire. An admirer of 
German culture, Peter the Great reaffirmed the rights and privileges of the Baltic 
Germans, known as the “Baltic Barons,” establishing them as pseudo-rulers who were 
allowed to manage the region under his authority. Extremely loyal to the crown, the 
Baltic Germans enjoyed their privileged status and promoted German cultural 
dominance.7  
 Lithuania’s early history differed greatly from its northern neighbors.8 Whereas 
Estonia and Livonia fell to other powers without much resistance, Lithuania was the last 
European nation to Christianize, resisting the change for as long as possible. Its early 
                                                 
5 John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the 
Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Longman, Inc., 1991), 11. 
6 Hiden, 11-12 and Alfred Bilmanis, A History of Latvia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1951), 172. 
7 Hiden, 12.  
8 V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania: the Rebel Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1997), 1. 
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success against the Teutonic Knights was due largely to its ability to unify against a 
common threat and place itself under a succession of strong leaders, beginning with the 
Grand Duke Mindaugas in 1253. In an attempt to ward off the danger posed by the 
Knights, Mindaugas converted to Christianity and had himself crowned the first (and 
only) king of Lithuania. The people, however, reaffirmed their pagan heritage and 
successfully held off the Teutonic Knights, even pushing their own influence into the 
Russian interior.9   
When they finally became part of Christian Europe, they did so not by force, but 
by politics. In order to form an alliance with and ultimately gain control of neighboring 
Poland, their leader Jagiello married the Polish queen in 1387 and ordered the forcible 
baptism of all his subjects.  In 1569, the official alliance of Lithuania with Poland created 
a territory which, until the eighteenth century, covered a substantial portion of Eastern 
Europe. The alliance finally fell when internal feuding among the Polish nobility 
weakened the nation to the point where they could no longer resist the growing power of 
Prussia, Austria, and Russia. In 1795, the third partition of Poland gave Lithuania to the 
Russian empire.10  
 As historians John Hiden and Patrick Salmon point out in their history of the 
Baltic in the twentieth century, once the three Baltic countries became part of the Russian 
empire in the early nineteenth century it is easy to focus on their “common fate” rather 
than their continued differences. Even to present day, Estonia and Latvia share a closer 
connection with each other than with Lithuania. Religiously, Estonia and Latvia are 
                                                 
9 Vardys, 10 and Hiden, 12. 
10 Hiden, 12. 
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Lutheran while Lithuania remains Catholic. Economically, Estonia and Latvia became 
centers of industry while Lithuania remained largely agrarian.11  
Once the Baltic region became part of the Russian empire, little immediate 
change occurred. Ruling in the name of the tsar, the Baltic Germans retained their feudal 
rights as landed nobility. During the Enlightenment, many moved to the major cities 
which quickly became favored destinations for the wealthy elite. Not immune to the 
influence of the Enlightenment, numerous landowners sought to modernize their estates 
by cultivating ideals of freedom and intellectual improvement. By 1819, full 
emancipation of the serfs occurred in the Baltic region forty-two years before the rest of 
the Russian Empire. The Baltic Germans not only liberated the native populations, but 
also encouraged them to ‘discover’ their own culture by promoting the study of native 
languages through folklore and songs.12 Industrialization promoted further nationalistic 
growth as landless peasants flocked to the cities eventually creating an educated middle 
class that would soon challenge the Baltic Germans for cultural dominance. 
The greatest challenge to German hegemony came in 1881 with the policy of 
russification under Alexander III. The growth of nationalism throughout Western Europe 
exemplified by German unification in 1871 soon influenced the tsar to promote the rapid 
development of a unified Russian Empire. Alexander III feared what he perceived as the 
potential threat of the large German population in control of the Baltic region.13 For those 
seeking to modernize and centralize the empire, the privileges of the Baltic Germans 
hindered progress. The introduction of the Russian language as the official language of 
                                                 
11 Hiden, 13. 
12 Ibid 16-21. 
13 Theodore R. Weeks, “Russification: Word and Practice, 1863-1914,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, 148 (December 2004): 475. 
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government and privilege in 1885 deliberately undermined German dominance in the 
Baltic. Even the German-speaking University of Tartu in Estonia, known as the 
intellectual capital of the region, was renamed the University of Iurev in 1893 cementing 
Russian as the new dominant culture and language. In Lithuania, the Russian government 
even accused German landowners of supporting the Polish uprisings of 1860 and 1863 
and confiscated their estates, dividing them amongst their peasants.14  
Ironically, an unintended consequence of the attack against German influence in 
the Baltic in the mid-nineteenth century was the so-called ‘awakening’ of Baltic 
nationalism. In urban centers, the growing bourgeoisie began to challenge the status quo 
by promoting education and instruction in native languages, not just German or Russian. 
The response was impressive. According to the 1897 Russian census, in Livonia and 
Estonia, ninety-two to ninety-three percent of the population was literate – this compared 
to thirty percent in the rest of the empire. Unlike its neighbors, Lithuania remained 
largely agricultural with low literacy levels – though this fact did not prevent the growth 
of nationalism. The brutality they experienced at the hands of the Russians encouraged 
many during this time to immigrate to the United States.15  Leading up to the First World 
War, the policies of both the Baltic Germans and russification encouraged the growth of 
a nationalistic fervor in all three Baltic countries. 
For much of the First World War, the Baltic served as a battleground between 
Germany and Russia, each fighting for control over a region both claimed as belonging to 
them. Preempting them both, the Baltic countries each declared their independence 
during the first few months of 1918. Following the upheaval of the October Revolution 
                                                 
14 Hiden, 14-15, 17. 
15 Ibid, 18-19. 
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and the collapse of the Russian Empire, as well as the defeat of Germany and the general 
confusion of postwar Europe, their grab for independence became a reality. At Versailles 
in 1919 after the war, the Balts lobbied for recognition citing President Wilson’s 
declaration of self-determination as validation for their request.16 Few in the West at the 
time even knew where the Baltic was located. In fact, astonishingly, the French 
government offered to make a loan to the city of Riga in yen, thinking the city to be an 
island off the coast of Japan.17 While working to establish their status within the rest of 
Europe, Vladimir Lenin moved to secure the region as part of the new Soviet Empire, 
consequently drawing them into conflict once again during the Russian Civil War. 
In the spring of 1920, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each established peace 
treaties with the Bolsheviks recognizing their independence from Russia and granting the 
Russians access to Baltic ports. On 26 January 1921, the three countries each received 
official de jure recognition by the great European Powers, followed soon after by 
admission into the League of Nations on 22 September. The following year, the United 
States government gave full recognition as well. In addition, the United States voiced its 
appreciation of the Baltic republics’ successful separation from Russia, according to the 
official release, by “the successful maintenance within their borders of political and 
economic stability.”18 Of note, however, is the reality that the stronger European nations 
saw little future for the newly formed Baltic countries outside of the Russian sphere of 
influence. Though the Balts pushed hard to promote their own economic and political 
growth, critics warned them not to stray too far from the Russian sphere of influence. In 
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an analysis of the situation, the head of the Northern Department of British Foreign 
Office, J.D. Gregory, stated that the economic prosperity of the region was dependent on 
the “economic union, but cultural independence” of the former Russian states as “the best 
hope for the future.”19 Through peace agreements with Russia, the Baltic countries hoped 
to develop economic security by allowing access to, but not control over their resources. 
The experience of the Baltic countries during the 1920s was one of economic 
growth and political nation-building. Never experiencing true independence before, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania set about the task of creating a working social, political, 
and cultural structure. Following the democratic model, each country developed a 
constitution, appointed a parliament, and elected a president. As a whole, the period was 
one of economic growth and political experimentation. Along with Finland and Poland, 
the Baltic countries declared neutrality to prevent their involvement in future wars; 
Estonia and Latvia went further with the promise of mutual assistance should the need 
arise.20 Both Latvia and Estonia passed the first minority rights legislation in Europe.21 
Estonia’s Law of Cultural Autonomy, passed in 1925, awarded any minority which 
consisted of over three thousand people official status and the ability to administer their 
own cultural and educational affairs.22  
Lithuania passed land reform acts in the socialist model, the state confiscating 
large landholdings and distributing it among the largely peasant population in hopes of 
creating loyalty to the new government and desire to help the nation succeed.23 The 
leaders of each nation knew they needed to create a functioning state. Trial and error with 
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official policies, however, would leave each country open to authoritarian regimes by the 
end of the 1920s. 
The economic downturn brought about by the Depression soon changed the face 
of government in the Baltic. Falling demand for exports and a dramatic drop in Russia’s 
use of Baltic ports caused popular unrest. Seizing the moment, right wing nationalists 
quickly took control of the governments in an attempt to restore stability. Lithuania was 
the first to lose its democracy when President Anatana Smetona seized control in 1926. 
An admirer of fascism and right wing radicalism, Smetona’s Nationalist Party promoted 
an even stronger sense of Lithuanian nationalism, began a strong youth movement under 
the banner “Lithuania for Lithuanians,” and hailed Smetona as the savior of the nation. 
As historian Alan Palmer argues, “There were strong echoes of Nazi political technique” 
within the movement.24 Though anti-Semitism became fashionable, it never escalated to 
the point of the brutality later practiced in Germany.25 
Estonia’s fall to authoritarianism came because of a bloodless, yet cold-blooded, 
political coup led by Prime Minister Konstantin Pats. Facing a potential loss of power to 
the popular para-military group under war veteran Artur Sirk in 1934, Pats declared a 
state of emergency and suspended all public meetings and elections indefinitely while 
dissolving parliament leaving him as sole authority. Despite accusations of brutality and 
even the murder of political rivals, Pats remained popular among Estonians. This was due 
in large part to the brief economic revival following the takeover of business by the state 
coupled with subsidies for farmers in order to support growth of resources for export.26 
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An admirer of fascism, Pats created the Fatherland League in 1935, modeled strongly 
after Mussolini’s policies in Italy.27 
Of the three countries, Latvia was the only one to remain (if in name only) a 
democracy. One of the founding fathers of the Latvian Republic, Karlis Ulmanis declared 
a state of emergency and seized control on 15 May 1934. Electing himself as head of 
state in 1936, Ulmanis suspended national elections and focused on reviving Latvia’s 
economy. He did this by encouraging a balance of exports over imports, making Latvia 
less reliant on foreign goods for survival.28 Altogether, his regime was relatively tolerant. 
Ulmanis campaigned against the rise of communism and anti-Semitism within Latvia, 
claiming defense of the republic as his motivation. In 1938, he lifted the state of 
emergency, but remained in power until the first Soviet invasion in 1940.29 
In Latvia and Estonia, the regimentation of the laissez-faire attitude had 
surprisingly little effect on the middle class, which continued to grow until both nations 
were essentially middle class populations. Latvian diplomat Artur Bilmanis argued that 
individual drive coupled with the desire to see their nation succeed reconciled the middle 
class to authoritarianism.30 The threat to internal freedoms from dictatorial policies 
seemed small compared to the threat of losing freedom entirely to Soviet Russia or the 
now formidable Nazi Germany. As Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British Minister to 
the Baltic, wrote in a dispatch, dated September 1934,  
There is a ‘lives of the hunted’ element in the attitude of these small States 
to their great neighbors; and it would be difficult to decide which in the 
last resort they fear most – the protective solicitude of the Soviet Union, 
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the clumsy directness of Germany, or the devouring overtures of Poland. 
Obviously, the intentions of none of the three are strictly honorable, and 
the question, ‘how will it end?’ must frequently arise in the minds of 
Baltic statesmen.31 
 
By the eve of the Second World War, the world order that maintained Baltic 
independence had disappeared under the weight of the Depression. One-time investors 
now became economic rivals as each country turned inward to solve its own financial 
problems. The loss of support from one of their largest investors, Great Britain, left the 
Baltic open to threats from both Germany and the Soviet Union who saw in the region a 
land of natural resources they coveted for themselves. 
 The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty on 23 August 1939 in 
Moscow signaled the end of the Baltic’s short-lived independence. In essence, the 
agreement between Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin divided Eastern Europe into spheres of 
influence marked for either German or Soviet occupation. In exchange for Soviet non-
interference when war began, Hitler agreed to give uncontested control over the Baltic 
region and the eastern half of Poland to Stalin.32 In June of 1940, while the eyes of the 
world watched in horror as German forces marched first into Warsaw, then later into 
Brussels, Amsterdam, and Paris, Stalin issued an ultimatum to the leaders of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania: “join the Soviet Union voluntarily or by force.” By the morning of 
17 June 1940, the Soviet army crossed into the Baltic. In this way began what most 
witnesses and survivors remember as a long year of terror and hardship. 
Census records from 1939 estimate that the Latvian population numbered 
1,994,506 people, the Estonian population numbered around 1,133,940, and the 
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Lithuanians numbered around 2,879,070.33 By 1944, the war casualties sustained by each 
country numbered in the hundreds of thousands – including those killed as soldiers in 
battle, executed by occupational forces, deported to Siberia as “enemies of the Soviet 
Union” or to Germany as “voluntary workers,” or those who fled in 1944.34 The first 
Soviet occupation only lasted from 1940-1941, but the experience traumatized the native 
populations who remember nothing but hardship and constant fear. The Soviets held 
mock elections and established a puppet communist regime in each country. In the 
summer of 1940, Estonian Prime Minister Konstantin Pats and Latvian Prime Minister 
Karlis Ulmanis, along with their families and military advisors, were the first group the 
Soviets deported to destinations where their ultimate fate remains unknown. Few 
deportees ever returned home. Only Lithuania’s President Anatana Smetona managed to 
flee Lithuania before his arrest.35    
Stalin desired to reshape the Baltic region into a model Soviet state.  In response 
to Lithuanian criticism of Soviet actions in June 1940, Soviet Foreign Commissar 
Vyacheslav Molotov, who signed the Non-Aggression Treaty and would later broker 
peace with Great Britain, stated “that in the future small nations will have to disappear” 
as they are incorporated along with the rest of Europe into the Soviet Union.36 To do so, 
however, Stalin needed to rid the country of its strong bourgeoisie influence. A list of 
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twenty three categories of ‘enemies of the state’ targeted members of the middle class 
including all politicians, police, judges, military, religious clergy, manufacturers, 
merchant landowners, and prosperous peasants. Had Hitler not decided in the summer of 
1941 to break the Non-Aggression Treaty by attacking the Soviet Union along the 
Eastern Front, these full-scale deportations would have taken place. As it was, before 
their full evacuation in front of the German advance, the Soviets arrested thousands 
during the night and deported them aboard cattle trains to Siberia. From there, few 
returned. According to one estimate, between 1940 and 1941 the Soviets deported or 
executed 34,250 Latvians, 60,000 Estonians, and 75,000 Lithuanians.37   
Files found left behind by Soviet officers fleeing the German army in June 1941, 
show Soviet plans for massive deportations of as many as 800,000 people in Latvia and 
Estonia. In Lithuania, the Serov Instruction (named after the Soviet General placed in 
charge of the deportations) called for the rounding up of all ‘anti-Soviet’ elements. Still 
other files showed plans for the deportation of 700,000 from Lithuania.38 With the threat 
of Russia’s return in 1944 and the memory of that year of terror and fear of reprisals 
against them as Nazi collaborators, thousands fled with the retreating German army to 
wait out the end of the war. 
On 22 June 1941, when German forces entered the Baltic they were initially 
greeted by the majority of the populations as liberators from the Soviets. As quickly 
became apparent, Germany had little concern for the welfare or independence of the 
Baltic countries. After signing the Non-Aggression Treaty in 1939, Hitler had secretly 
ordered the evacuation of the Baltic German populations in Estonia and Latvia. All 
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together, some 13,700 Baltic Germans from Estonia and 52,583 from Latvia evacuated 
back to the Reich despite little Soviet effort compelling them to leave.39 Once there, they 
settled in newly acquired territories of Poland.  
When Germany entered the Baltic, they did so as conquerors intent on clearing 
the region of all undesirables as part of the greater vision of Lebensraum. At Hitler’s 
request, Alfred Rosenburg planned the occupation of Eastern Europe. In May 1941, 
Rosenburg stated: 
The General Kommissare of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will take 
measures to establish a German Protectorate there, so that it will be 
possible in the future to annex these territories to the German Reich. The 
suitable elements among the population must be assimilated and the 
undesirable elements exterminated. The Baltic Sea must become an inland 
German lake, under the protection of Greater Germany.40 
 
The Germans paired the Baltic with Belorussia in the Reichkommisariat Ostland, under 
the control of Heinrich Lohse, “a man obsessed with bureaucratic detail who personally 
insisted on signing ‘No Smoking’ signs and regulations for garbage collection.”41 
 Tragically, the Nazis nearly succeeded in their plans for the total extermination of 
the Baltic Jewish population. Of the prewar Jewish population of 250,000 in Lithuania, 
only 2,000 remained by the summer of 1944, “by far the largest casualty of the German 
occupation.”42 In Latvia, only an estimated 3,000 remained alive by December 1941. In 
Estonia, although only one to two thousand remained after the first Soviet occupation, the 
Germans nearly destroyed the few that remained.43 Moreover, because of the area’s 
remoteness and the existing anti-Semitism of the population, the Nazis sent Jews from 
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elsewhere in the conquered territories to the Baltic for extermination. In Latvia, the Nazis 
deported an additional 20,000 Jews from Germany, Austria, and other ‘protectorates,’ to 
the Riga ghetto. Of those who arrived, less than a thousand would live to see the end of 
the war. After February of 1942, transports did not even stop in the ghettos, heading 
instead for the Rimbala Forest outside Riga for extermination.44 The level of Baltic 
participation in the Holocaust is a shameful one.  
By the end of the war, this subject would prove an important point as repatriation 
of refugees back to their Soviet-controlled homes would focus on the level of acceptance 
and support given the Nazis during their occupation. At his trial in 1946, SS General 
Friedrich Jeckeln declared that he did not know how many Jews died during the German 
occupation because the native populations had killed so many before he arrived to 
assume command.45 Yet, according to Brigadefuhrer Stahlecker, in a report to Himmler 
dated October 1941, “To our surprise, it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive 
pogrom against the Jews.”46 The native population, although anti-Semitic, participated 
less in the actual killings than the Nazis publicly portrayed. Regardless, their participation 
in the genocide makes them culpable.  
 During the war, the Nazis conscripted thousands of able bodied men and women 
into the German war machine as soldiers on the Eastern Front and “voluntary workers” in 
factories in Germany. Still in Germany at the war’s end, most would choose to remain as 
refugees rather than return to Soviet control. Though armed resistance against German 
occupational forces did occur, it was on a relatively small scale and faced fierce 
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retaliation from German troops. In Latvia, the Nazis killed or deported all members of 
military partisan groups. In Estonia and Lithuania, however, resistance groups struggled 
to survive throughout the German occupation, but they, too, eventually succumbed to the 
Soviet’s second occupation in 1944. 
 “For the majority populations of the Baltic countries,” writes Hiden, “the best that 
could be said of German rule between 1941 and 1944 was that it was less harsh than the 
periods of Soviet rule . . . and less brutal than the treatment meted out by Germany to the 
other subject nationalities of Eastern Europe.”47 Fear of Soviet reoccupation terrified the 
populations as the war turned against the Germans and the Soviet army moved closer to 
the Baltic once again.  
By 1944, the Germans began a large scale retreat from the region and with them 
went thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. The risk of flight soon became 
apparent. Those who fled by ship to Germany and Sweden faced the very real danger of 
Soviet bombs destroying their ship. Refugee memoirs, such as Agate Nesuale’s A Woman 
in Amber, recount the experience of flight from their homelands. For those who fled 
overland, fear of capture by Soviet troops was of chief concern, especially for women. 
Nesaule’s horrific account of attempting to flee to Germany on foot and the days she and 
her mother spent as Soviet prisoners paints a vivid picture of rape, murder, and execution 
that leaves no question of redemption for Soviet Russia.48 
Caught between Germany and the Soviet Union by the end of the war, the Baltic 
refugees hoped that Great Britain and the United States would uphold the terms of the 
Atlantic Charter and support Baltic independence. Unfortunately, they soon discovered 
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that others had decided their fate before the war had even ended. As early as 1942, 
President Franklin Roosevelt approached Stalin hoping to form an alliance. British 
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, later recalled in his memoirs that Roosevelt “proposed 
to tell Stalin that . . . there would be no need to worry about the Baltic States, since their 
future clearly depends on Russian military progress and, if Russia reoccupied them, 
neither the United States, nor Britain would turn her out.”49  
The final blow to independence, however, was the revelation of the Yalta 
Agreement. Signed on 11 February 1945 by Roosevelt, Stalin, and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, the agreement reached at the Yalta Conference guaranteed the return 
of all Allied nationals located in occupied territories on a reciprocal basis to their 
respective countries.50 With the Soviet Union once again in control of the Baltic 
countries, Moscow demanded the return of all natives to their homelands. This was a 
devastating blow for the refugees. The United States and Britain, the champions of 
democracy, with a single, deceptive agreement signed away the Baltic people’s freedom. 
With no organized leadership and no means through which to officially communicate 
their own desires as a people to the Allies, the Baltic refugees chose the only means of 
protest available to them – they refused to return. This refusal would bring the issue of 
how to handle a large-scale refugee crisis to international attention. 
                                                
No matter how proud they remained of their cultural heritage and of their struggle 
for recognition as independent countries, the postwar reality facing Estonians, Latvians, 
and Lithuanians was that they were not especially important to those in power. For 
centuries, the Baltic countries were subject to the demands and wars of their more 
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powerful neighbors; their brief period of independence made them even more determined 
to regain it again. Their refusal to return to their now Soviet controlled homelands was a 
decision based not only on fear and experience, but was meant to force the Western 
World to live up to their own ideals of freedom and democracy, for all. If the Allies said 
they must return, they were determined not to go without a fight. 
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CHAPTER III  
THE DP EXPERIENCE, 1946-1949 
Speaking to the American Academy of Political Sciences in 1947 on the postwar 
refugee situation in Europe, Joseph P. Chamberlain, professor of Public Law at Columbia 
University, declared, “Never has so great a movement of peoples taken place in so short a 
time as that which has left a million persons uprooted from their homes and living in 
foreign lands. They constitute a major problem for the United Nations.”51 Needing to 
address a large-scale refugee problem effectively was a new situation faced by the Allied 
forces at the end of the war. Once the war ended millions displaced by the war would 
desire immediate return to their abandoned homelands and initial efforts towards a 
comprehensive refugee plan focused mainly on repatriation. Immediately after the war 
the majority of refugees did return home, but over a million did not. Mostly from 
countries in Eastern Europe, these Displaced Persons (DPs) steadfastly refused to 
repatriate to their now Soviet-controlled homelands. This refusal surprised the Allied 
victors who imagined a quick, if not easy, return of all refugees to their homes once the 
war ended. They suddenly needed to re-evaluate their postwar reconstruction plans.   
 The situation of the DPs from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania proved particularly 
difficult as early Cold War tensions between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet 
Union increased. With no existing form of native government, the Baltic DPs protested 
the Soviet takeover of their homelands by refusing to repatriate. If the Allies would not 
stand by their own principles of freedom and democracy, the Baltic DPs would do 
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nothing to ease their conscience. With the failure of repatriation, resettlement became the 
only viable option for solving the refugee situation. 
As early as 1943, the United Nations made far-sighted plans to support the 
repatriation of postwar refugees in Europe. In Washington on 9 November, the 
representatives of forty-four countries created the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to coordinate aid for countries devastated by the 
events of the World War II. Speaking to the representative assembly, U.S. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt claimed that the creation of UNRRA ensured that the financial and 
physical burden of restoring order in Europe fell on many shoulders, not just a few. There 
could be no secured peace unless the displaced populations returned home to restore 
order and rebuild their lives.52 UNRRA coordinated the activities of twenty-three 
voluntary agencies, including the Joint Distribution Committee, the Organization for 
Rehabilitation through Training, and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society.53 The United 
States was the largest financial contributor, providing seventy-two percent of UNRRA’s 
budgets, followed by Britain, Australia, and Canada. UNRRA became the first, large-
scale administrations created solely to deal with the handling of postwar refugees.  
 By the end of the war, over eight million refugees lived scattered across Europe.  
Within a year, American and British occupational forces successfully repatriated all but 
1.2 million persons. Redefined as DPs, these “die-hard” refugees from Eastern Europe 
steadfastly refused to return to their Soviet-controlled homelands fearing reprisals against 
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them as “Nazi-collaborators.” In August 1946, UNRRA began full-scale operations in 
occupied Germany to aid in the repatriation of this remaining group.  
 UNRRA set about the task of bringing order to the situation, subject to the 
supervision of the occupational authorities who retained ultimate responsibility for the 
care and support of the DPs within their zone. Their main function focused on providing 
the DPs with living arrangements, food, and medical treatment. They established a 
records office and tracing bureau to help categorize the DPs based on personal histories. 
This proved invaluable for Holocaust survivors in locating surviving friends and family 
members. UNRRA also worked with other agencies on the possibility of resettlement 
elsewhere, although these plans remained preliminary and focused on Jewish DPs. 
UNRRA provided the DPs with luxury items such as chocolate, cigarettes, and toiletries 
that often served as currency on the thriving black market within the camp system.54 The 
function of UNRRA was not to physically repatriate the DPs, but instead to persuade 
them to return by coordinating and supplying food rations for the journey and funds 
necessary to send them home. UNRRA could not forcibly return any persons “other than 
intruders” who did not desire to repatriate.55 Occupational forces carried out the actual 
act of repatriation. 
                                                
 UNRRA soon established DP camps, officially labeled “assembly centers,” in 
order to list and classify each person seeking admission. At least 443 assembly centers 
existed in the U.S. zone alone.56 These centers, mostly former prisoner-of-war camps, 
army barracks, and concentration camps, became the focal point for thousands of 
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refugees besieging UNRRA for aid and support. Screening took place to determine 
whether any of the persons were SS personnel, Nazi Party Affiliates, on CIC wanted lists, 
criminals, collaborators, or imposters posing a security threat to the camp system.57 
Those eligible for UNRRA assistance included former prisoners-of-war, victims of 
enemy prosecution based on race, religion, or other factors, stateless persons, and 
internally displaced women and children.58 The purpose of these categories centered on 
ensuring that only those displaced by events or actions out of their control receive aid and 
support. The fear remained that willing Nazi collaborators would slip through as DPs 
rather than face charges for war crimes. By December 1945, UNRRA supported an 
estimated 855,000 DPs from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 Technically, the Baltic DPs did not qualify for this assistance. According to its 
charter, UNRRA could only assist those foreign nationals whose country of origin gave 
UNRRA permission to do so.59 Claiming the Baltic DPs as foreign nationals, the Soviet 
Union invoked the Yalta Agreement and demanded their return (voluntarily or forced) to 
the Baltic countries. The Baltic DPs, refusing to acknowledge that they now belonged to 
the Soviet Union, flooded the UNRRA camps. The principle that UNRRA should act “on 
a purely humanitarian basis, without political bias” allowed UNRRA officials to accept 
the Baltic DPs regardless of their legal standing.60  UNRRA’s Central Headquarters in 
Germany reported that 27,000 Estonians, 86,000 Latvians, and 54,000 Lithuanians 
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claimed DP status by the end of 1945.61 According to U.S. Zone Administrative Order 
No. 43, although UNRRA should make all efforts towards repatriation, it “must observe 
its charter responsibilities not to force anyone to return to his or her home unwillingly.”62 
For those unwilling or unable to repatriate, UNRRA could provide temporary care until it 
was decided what to do with them.63 According to Audrey Duchesne-Cripps, an UNRRA 
welfare worker, officials sent those deemed ineligible for UNRRA aid to camps directly 
under military control with no UNRRA participation.64 Without UNRRA assistance, the 
DPs had little chance of avoiding repatriation and little hope for resettlement elsewhere. 
 A more serious problem presented by the Baltic DPs was the difficulty of 
distinguishing war criminals among them. During World War II, the Nazis conscripted 
thousands of young, able-bodied men into native SS Legions sending them to fight on the 
Eastern Front. Although the level of voluntary participation in the Legion is still a 
contested issue among historians and survivors, identification as a former SS officer at 
the time meant arrest and deportation back to Soviet-controlled territories. The majority 
of the DPs seeking admission into the camps carried no identity papers with them, either 
lost or discarded. These chaotic circumstances made it easy for guilty parties to pose as 
DPs. 
 As Cold War tensions increased, the problem of DPs became a serious point of 
contention between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
refused UNRRA permission to carry out its operations within their territories, citing 
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UNRRA’s practice of aiding Soviet nationals refusing to repatriate. Soviet allegations 
that UNRRA and its supporters allowed war criminals to escape prosecution became 
commonplace. In spite of these often justified complaints, UNRRA carried out operations 
as well as possible.  
 Many UNRRA and volunteer workers arriving at the DP camps were astonished 
at the sheer size of the centers. Katie Louchheim, a UNRRA relief worker, remembers 
her first glimpse of the camp at Weisbaden as an enormous barracks housing 75,000 DPs 
composed of “seven or eight different nationalities.”65 One observer characterized the 
outside appearance of the average center as “a depressing conglomeration of bomb-
scarred, burnt-out buildings.” Camp officials and volunteer workers worked to repair 
roofs, broken windows, and to supply heat and electricity to make the camps inhabitable 
for the typically three to four thousand DP residents. Several families commonly shared 
single, large rooms due to limited living space. For most, privacy proved non-existent.66 
In May 1946, The Times reported that the average DP camp presented “a spectacle of 
complete neglect” owing to the failure to induce the displaced persons to become useful 
“by cultivating lands or maintaining roads” rather than “preying on the German 
population.”67 This was hardly the popular image UNRRA officials wanted the world to 
see.  
U.S. President Harry S. Truman sent the dean of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, Earl G. Harrison, to get a complete picture of the rapidly deteriorating 
conditions within the camps and their administration and assess the situation. Harrison 
presented Truman with his findings in August 1945. The report reflected numerous 
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interviews conducted with UNRRA officials, volunteer workers, and the DPs themselves 
along with Harrison’s own observations.68  
Harrison’s final report was critical of UNRRA, but even more so of the United 
States’ and Britain’s handling of the DPs. Harrison called for immediate changes in the 
administration of the DP problem. According to the report, UNRRA was focusing 
attention on quick repatriation rather than on long-term care and resettlement which 
caused “considerable resistance” to the entrance of voluntary agencies better qualified to 
handle the needs of the DPs.”69 He continued with the hope that since the “worst of the 
pressure of mass repatriation is over . . . the next and perhaps more difficult period for 
those who have suffered the most and the longest be given first and not last attention.”70 
He called particular attention to the sharp contrast of the DPs lack of clothing, shelter, 
and food while the Germans lived well in rural areas surrounding the camps. After 
observing these differences firsthand, Harrison dryly stated that the German people 
remained “the best dressed population in all of Europe.”71  
Harrison recommended that UNRRA receive full administrational authority over 
the camps, reasoning that the United States should use its influence to take immediate 
action in order to prevent more chaos. This would, in turn, allow privately funded 
voluntary groups the ability to help the DPs directly instead of dealing with government 
bureaucracy.72 Truman called for drastic change from UNRRA and military personnel in 
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response to Harrison’s report on the abuse and deteriorating conditions in the camps. 
Change did occur, but not to the hoped-for extent. The continued existence of the camps, 
despite efforts to improve the DPs’ lives with more food, better clothing, and improved 
housing, illustrated the failure to solve the DP problem. Though improved, the refugee 
situation continued.   
More criticisms from financial supporters and the international press soon leveled 
at UNRRA for the failure of the repatriation scheme. Lack of centralized control resulted 
in UNRRA enjoying less authority because of the need to seek constant approval for its 
actions from contributing countries.73 UNRRA ultimately failed through lack of authority 
and inability to act on its own initiative resulting in mismanaged voluntary aid and 
funding. Voluntary religious groups met resistance from UNRRA officials who lacked 
the ability and resources to coordinate the transportation and assignment of volunteer 
workers. For example in By the Rivers of Babylon, Margaret McNeill described her work 
as part of a British Quaker volunteer group sent to help in the Baltic DP camps. McNeill 
relates the confusion of finding out who was in charge, where they were supposed to go, 
and the quick turnaround of workers to and from the camps.74 Historian W. Arnold 
Foster reported to the Royal Institute of International Affairs that UNRRA’s authorit
was “completely surrendered to the Army.” The organization of the was camps so 
inadequate, Foster continued, “that the liaison officer did not know where many of th
UNNRA teams were, and was not consulted or even informed when teams were broken 
y 
e 
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up or when UNRRA officers were in effect relieved of their jobs.”75 UNRRA, though 
criticized for its failures and increasingly seen by financial supporters as a waste of time 
and resources, had little authority to change and so kept working to achieve the
objective of r
ir 
epatriation. 
                                                
In autumn 1946 and spring 1947, UNRRA made one last attempt to convince 
remaining DPs to return home. As part of “Repatriation Drive,” UNRRA offered 
incentives such as free transportation, financial support on their arrival, and a 60 day 
ration supply for repatriating DPs.76 However, the Baltic DPs numbers for repatriation 
remained low. In a letter to the Britain’s Refugee Defence Committee on 25 February 
1947, the permanent secretary of the Control Office in Germany and Austria wrote that of 
the eighty thousand Baltic DPs living in the British Zone of Germany only forty-three 
repatriated.77 Fewer than three thousand of the remaining Baltic DPs voluntarily 
repatriated back to Soviet control by 1949.78 
Between 1946 and 1947, contention over repatriation between the United States, 
Britain, and the Soviet Union escalated. The fate of DPs from Eastern Europe emerged as 
a hotly contested issue where emotions ran high. Historian Malcolm J. Proudfoot, in one 
of the first studies on mass repatriation and the postwar refugee crisis, found that over 
250,000 DPs living in the occupied Western zones of Germany and Austria did not claim 
Soviet citizenship. These DPs refused to acknowledge their nationalities fearing Soviet 
 
75 Forster, 6. 
76 “Displaced Persons 1 July 1946- 30 June 1947,” 55. 
77 “Letter to the Refugees Defence Committee on the Subject of Baltic Displaced Persons,” in The Latvian 
Legion: Selected Documents, ed. Mirzda Kate Baltais (Toronto, Canada: Amber Printers and Publishers, 
1999), 147. 
78 Proudfoot, 416. 
 37
retribution against them as Nazi sympathizers should they return home.79 Yet UNRRA 
officials could not ignore the Soviet Union’s position as one of the major postwar powers. 
 Officially, UNRRA recognized the Soviet Union as “the government concerned” 
with the repatriation of the Baltic DPs. 80  UNRRA officials, however, refused to give 
them the names of individuals unless those DPs claimed Soviet citizenship.81  On 11 
November 1946, UNRRA issued an order providing for Soviet “liaison officers” to visit 
the DP camps to distribute newspapers, propaganda films, and other emotional devices to 
attempt and persuade the Baltic and other Eastern European DPs to repatriate. The Soviet 
Union set up repatriation centers to serve as transport site for DPs returning home under 
the supervision of the United States Army.82 UNRRA personnel soon received accusation 
from anti-Soviet groups claiming the organization followed too closely the Soviet 
practice in handling refugees, so obsessed with repatriation that all their efforts went into 
pursuit of that goal. In Refugees are People, Eastern European affairs specialist, Walter 
Dushnyck, described the “skillful repatriation officer” as one who overcame the DPs’ 
fear of repatriation. Rather than dreaming of emigration, the officer persuaded the DPs to 
plan in terms of “calm consideration of alternatives and acceptance of repatriation.”83 
However, the Soviets often tried to influence the DPs’ decision. The New York Times 
even made accusations of espionage, reporting at least one Soviet spy found on 
UNRRA’s payroll.84  The presence of Soviet liaison officers increased tension within the 
DP camps. 
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The DPs grew concerned that the Allies meant to forcibly repatriate them as they 
had Russian prisoners-of-war and political refugees. In March 1947, Baltic DPs in Berlin 
led protests after UNRRA denied assistance to 300 Lithuanians and forcibly evicted them 
from the assembly center.85 In Alenstadt, Germany, a mob of DPs attacked UNRRA 
officials and American soldiers to protest repatriation, and only the use of tear gas and 
displays of military force restored order.86 In certain camps, conditions deteriorated to the 
point that U.S. Military officials enlisted the help of the German police to gain control.87 
Lieutenant Colonel Jerry M. Sage of the U.S. Army once asked the Baltic DPs why they 
so adamantly opposed repatriation. They replied that they would rather die than return to 
the hands of the same people who took everything away from them in 1940 and 1941.88 
The memories of lost freedom and deported loved ones never heard from again remained 
fresh in the minds of the Baltic DPs. Their steadfast opposition to any effort to send them 
back gained them the sympathy of the occupational authorities who viewed Soviet 
actions with growing suspicion. 
Acting on this suspicion, U.S. President Truman looked to remedy the DP 
situation. After reading Earl G. Harrison’s report, Truman contacted General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Chief of Staff and Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation zone, apprising 
him of the report’s findings and of the changes needed in the administration of the camps. 
Truman acknowledged the delicacy of the Baltic DPs’ situation and the vehemence of 
their refusal to repatriate. Although return to their homelands remained the ultimate 
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ambition of the Baltic DPs, until a change in the political situation occurred they refused 
to repatriate.89 Since the Truman administration supported the right of Estonians, 
Latvians, and Lithuanians to refuse repatriation, this left the United States government 
and its allies with the problem of what to do with those thousands not repatriated. It was 
becoming apparent that no further change would occur under UNRRA’s continued 
supervision. 
The Baltic DPs’ refusal to return home caused tension between the three great 
powers. In December 1945, the British liaison in Moscow stated that the faith placed by 
the Baltic DPs in the United States’ and Britain’s ability to save them from Soviet control 
seemed “not only pathetic, but dangerous.”90 Nevertheless, sympathy for their plight 
grew considerably. By 1946, occupational authorities in the western zones viewed the 
Baltic DPs as “innocent or at worst misguided” rather than Nazi supporters and war 
criminals.91  
As per the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union demanded the return of all refugees 
belonging to countries now under Soviet control. Growing Cold War resentment, 
however, and distaste with the repercussions of forced repatriation, influenced American 
and British actions. They responded to Soviet demands with a re-interpretation of Yalta. 
Though the United States and Britain agreed to continue repatriating all citizens who had 
belonged to the Soviet Union before the war, both reinterpreted the agreement concerning 
citizens of those countries gained after of the war. Unless those persons from countries 
gained by the Soviet Union after September 1936 claimed Soviet citizenship, 
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occupational forces treated them as DPs and not as Soviet citizens. On 12 February 1946, 
the United Nations Assembly passed a new resolution stating that no refugee or DP 
expressing “valid objections” to repatriation would be compelled to return to their 
country of origin.92 For those labeled as Soviet citizens this was a cruel twist of fate. 
Many Russians had fled the Soviet Union during the Stalinist purges in 1937 and 1938 
and feared for their lives if returned to Soviet control.93 For citizens of the Baltic 
countries the reinterpretation of Yalta meant a chance to start again. 
 The Soviet government took the resolution as a sign of Western aggression and 
took on the role of a wounded martyr prevented by evil bureaucrats and fascist 
sympathizers from returning its native children back home. In a letter to the editor of The 
Times, printed 12 June 1947, Soviets in Estonia claimed that DP camp authorities and 
former Nazi collaborators of Baltic descent waged propaganda campaigns to persuade 
Baltic nationals from returning home. “Those [DPs] who wish to return home are 
terrorized,” they wrote, “and if this does not help they are forcibly restrained.”94 With the 
end of the threat of forcible repatriation, the Baltic DPs waited in the camps while others 
decided their fate. 
Nearly a year passed before that decision came. With repatriation no longer an 
option, resettlement seemed the best alternative. According to Michael R. Marrus in his 
definitive work on European refugees, The Unwanted, the approval of the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO) on 15 December 1946 was the culmination point of a year of 
tense political situations between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. 
Continued Soviet opposition delayed the IRO from assuming UNRRA’s responsibilities 
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until 1 July 1947. Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, 
attacked the creation of the IRO claiming that it provided fascists a place to hide and the 
ability to spread propaganda against their homelands.95 On gaining control, the IRO took 
the stance that the occupational forces should resettle unrepatriable DPs as quickly as 
possible.96 Unlike UNRRA, the IRO functioned outside UN supervision allowing more 
specialization among personnel and direct control over the thousands of DPs under their 
supervision.97 Under its authority the supervision of and conditions within the camps 
improved considerably. By the time IRO operations were underway, Soviet actions 
during the Berlin Blockade and the invasion of Hungary put an end to all but minimal 
efforts at repatriation by the IRO.  
 The IRO set about the business of opening the doors of viable host countries to 
receive the DPs as immigrants. Given control of forty ships for transport, the IRO formed 
agreements with countries like Australia and Canada to accept large numbers of DPs 
through sponsored work programs.98 Ironically, though the chief financial supporter of 
resettlement efforts, the United States would refuse to accept any DPs as immigrants until 
the passage of the Displaced Persons Act in 1948. To help the IRO make a proper 
assessment of the type and qualifications of the DPs in the assembly centers, the U.S. 
War Department issued the ceiling order of 21 April 1947, which directed officials to 
refuse admittance to any DPs entering the U.S. zone following 21 April, “except for 
hardship cases and persons about to be processed for repatriation or resettlement.”99 UN 
countries praised the IRO and its mandate for working to provide the DPs with the 
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chance to start over again. Yet in matters of international politics, words and actions often 
prove hypocritical. 
 In spite of their protestations of goodwill and sympathy for the DPs’ situation, the 
immigration policies in almost all the countries approached for resettlement centered on 
their own economic and practical needs. Functioning “as an international employment 
agency,” the IRO quickly adapted itself to sell the DPs to host countries as immigrant 
workers. Through medical examinations and background checks, the IRO set about 
recording the physical and mental capabilities of each DP seeking resettlement. The 
organization also established classes to teach the languages of the host countries to better 
prepare them for acceptance and immigration. Within a year, the IRO could provide a 
comprehensive list of information concerning language and occupational skills, physical 
and mental health, as well as marital status and family of each registered DP. Whether all 
the information given by the DPs was wholly accurate proved less certain.100 Once they 
passed the rigorous exam and interview process, DPs became free to travel to various 
recruitment centers throughout the occupational zones to apply for resettlement.   
 In an effort to organize the DPs, UNRRA and later the IRO grouped them into 
camps based on nationality. Officials generally placed the Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians together in “Balt camps.” The tendency for the middle-class and educated 
Estonians and Latvians to set themselves apart from the more agrarian Lithuanians was 
common. All three peoples, however, banded together through their common fear of 
repatriation. The constant transfer from one camp to another by military officials 
exacerbated the situation. In her memoir, Estonian DP Elin Toona remembers listening as 
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a child to talk about the fear of repatriation, the likelihood of resettlement, and the 
bittersweet memories of home.101 
 Constant animosity between the DPs and the surrounding German population 
became a common experience of life in the DP camps. Accusations traveled back and 
forth as to which population received better treatment, more food, and better overall care. 
In their report on the DP situation given in April 1947, UNRRA’s Central Headquarters 
for Germany stated that the DPs did not receive an equivalent standard of housing and 
clothing as the Germans. The food situation, however, seemed “reasonable in view of the 
low ration now imposed on the German population, and the difficulties in procuring a 
sufficiently diversified supply of food stocks to avoid monotony in diet.”102 This was not 
acceptable for those who believed that since the Germans began the war, they should 
support the DPs in a standard equal to or better than their own. This preferential treatment 
made the DPs targets for aggression of the surrounding population. Their continued 
presence in Germany served as a visible reminder of the war, focusing the anger and 
resentment of the native population on their shoulders. Toona recalls the constant 
tormenting of local German children towards her and her friends. On one occasion, a 
German teenage boy went so far as to kill her pet cat in front of her by striking it against 
a wall.103 
 Regardless of the uncertainty of their situation, the Baltic DPs struggled to 
reconstruct some sort of normal life. Balizar Radkins, Latvian DP and former National 
Secretary of the Latvian YMCA, wrote that need and misery brought people together in 
the camps. He describes at length how social and class differences seemed to disappear, 
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bringing the DPs closer together. In the camp where he lived, “the girls prepared curtains 
from paper bags; artists donated pictures,” people established gardens, libraries, sports 
clubs and other facets of “normal” life with determination.104 Latvian historian Modris 
Eksteins remembered how his family covered the walls of their room in the camps “with 
magazine pictures to hide its decrepit condition.”105 At the camp in Hanau, Lithuanian 
DPs converted a former riding school into a theater capable of seating up to three 
thousand fellow DPs. By 1950, Lithuanian DPs had established sixteen publishing houses 
in Germany. In total, twenty-seven Baltic newspapers and thirty-five magazines existed 
in the camps.106 Life in the camps, though monotonous, provided the means for 
nationalities to rebuild their cultural heritages.  
 Each DP camp largely ran itself. Camp officials encouraged the DPs to organize 
themselves along national lines. Each nationality within a camp selected representatives 
for a “camp advisory committee.” These committees made suggestions to camp 
authorities, established cultural programs and events to promote each heritage, and 
worked to solve mutual problems of camp life.107 One aspect of camp life that did not 
receive official approval was the existence of a thriving black market dealing in food and 
other luxury items. The keeping of livestock and pets, strictly forbidden in the camps due 
to disease control, led to frequent raids by camp officials. Life in the camps, though 
bearable, was not the life most DPs wanted. 
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 In many ways, life in the DP camps proved easier for the young than the old. A 
Latvian woman described how years later she realized just how much her youth protected 
her during that time:  
We had our social life there in the camps. So it wasn’t bad and when you 
are young, too that is different. It is just an adventure. But when I think 
about my parents, they had to leave everything behind, all their life, what 
they have saved and all they had, they had to leave behind. We only took a 
few silver spoons to exchange later on in Germany for food. They lost 
everything . . . maybe that’s why some people felt they could not leave.108 
 
For eighteen-year-old Helena, a Latvian DP, the monotony of daily life in the camps 
made the younger generation of DPs grasp whatever chances they could to enjoy 
themselves. American GIs, she recalled, although forbidden to fraternize with German 
girls, often came to the DP camps to pick up girls to take them to dances and other social 
events.109 Evenings spent dancing, coupled with the chance for romance, provided an 
escape from the camps if only for a few hours.  
 Along with the social aspects of camp life, the DPs together with voluntary 
agencies established schools within the camps, providing teachers, used textbooks, and 
other supplies for thousands of DP children. By 1947, reports claimed that ninety percent 
of children aged five to sixteen among the DPs attended school in the U.S. Occupied 
Zone alone. In early 1947, the British established the DP University Center in a former 
Luftwaffe School in Pinneberg, to provide the means for former university students to 
continue their education while living in the camps. Later efforts to transfer the university 
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to the United States failed. Official reasons given by British authorities in charge stated 
curiously that there were too many of “that type of person in the world already.”110  
 Military occupation authorities also recruited DPs as workers to help with various 
projects throughout occupied Germany. In the British Zone, for example, over one 
thousand Baltic DPs worked at dismantling German munitions factories. UNRRA began 
farming projects, serving the practical purpose of vocational training for the DPs.111 
Some DPs worked as administrators and clerks within the camps, serving as liaisons 
between military authorities and the DP groups. At one time, the U.S. Army employed 
almost 40,000 DPs in construction, vehicle maintenance, and trucking. With increased 
demobilization, this number dropped to 3,400 by July 1949.112 An employment service 
office in each center made sure that every employable DP received the chance to be 
useful, even helping some to establish barber and beauty shops to cater to camp 
populations.113 An occupational survey taken in 1947 in the U.S. zone found 150 
occupation skills among the DPs. The Baltic DPs were among the largest number of 
medical professionals, teachers, lawyers, artists, and construction workers.114  
 Resettlement began in earnest by 1947. The Baltic DPs now looked to their future 
without losing sight of their pasts. They attended classes to learn about the languages and 
customs of their future resettlement countries. To make themselves more attractive to 
recruiters as prospective immigrants, they lied when necessary about their pasts, 
occupational skills, and families. Healthy DPs substituted themselves for unhealthy 
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friends in order to help them pass medical exams with clean x-rays. Medical personnel 
regularly rejected those who showed signs of tuberculosis or dysentery, common diseases 
in the camps. Singles got married while couples pretended to be single, all to fit the 
requirements for immigration to their country of choice. Nearly every DP desired to leave 
the camps and begin a new life. 
 Initially following the war, the Baltic DPs placed their hope in the Western Allies 
to restore their countries to independence. Yet, with no government-in-exile to speak for 
their rights, the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian DPs remained powerless. Determined 
not to return to Soviet control, they refused efforts at repatriation and by their physical 
presence within the UNRRA assembly centers forced the UN to address their situation. 
Ultimately ineffectual due to lack of centralized control or authority, and the need to 
constantly justify every action taken, UNRRA failed in its objective of returning many 
DPs to their homes. Unwilling to use force against those whom their own actions placed 
under Soviet control, the United States and Britain reinterpreted the terms of the Yalta 
Agreement, allowing the Baltic DPs the chance to resettle elsewhere and begin again.  
 As early as 1946, Britain became the first country to recruit workers from the DP 
camps. Though the United States was the first choice of the majority of the DPs for 
resettlement, their doors remained closed in spite of President Truman’s best efforts until 
the passage of the Displaced Persons Act in 1948. Benefiting from U.S. reluctance, 
Australia and Canada both signed agreements with the IRO to establish large-scale work 
sponsorship programs to fill labor shortages in industry and boost population numbers. 
Among those first chosen for resettlement, the Baltic DPs took their cultural heritage and 
national pride with them. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BRITAIN AND THE BALTIC DPs, 1946-1949 
At the end of World War II, Clement Attlee and the Labour party persuaded 
British voters that they would transform England into a utopia – a type of “New 
Jerusalem” founded upon their sweeping welfare plan commonly known as the Beveridge 
Report. In this utopia, the government would provide for the welfare and security of each 
individual – defeating unemployment, hunger, and want, providing free healthcare, and 
restoring British culture. Part of this transformation was the maintenance of Britain’s role 
as a world power, a role damaged by the war. While focusing on these issues Labour 
faced another pressing problem – that of caring for the estimated 16 million refugees 
displaced by the war and now under Allied control. Ultimately, Britain’s handling of the 
refugee crisis involved the resettlement of thousands to the United Kingdom as 
immigrant workers in an economic and humanitarian effort to rebuild the nation’s 
economy, restore the population, and end the financial burden of supporting postwar 
occupied Europe. 
The ultimate failure of repatriation to solve the DP problem (due to the 
unwillingness of DPs from Soviet occupied countries to return home) forced Allied 
leaders to reevaluate their image of the DPs. While repatriation was still the most viable 
option, most viewed the DPs as merely trapped by circumstances, eager to return home 
and rebuild their lives no matter the dangers they faced in doing so. But for many these 
dangers proved far too real. Return was no longer an option for many of the Baltic DPs. 
Having survived the first Soviet occupation resulting from the Nazi-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact of August 1939, the postwar DPs in occupied Germany would not 
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willingly return to an occupation now given the victor’s legal sanction. Their 
determination forced British and American forces to act accordingly. Rather than view 
the DPs as victims, leaders now saw the potential of resettlement as the solution to their 
own economic, defensive, and humanitarian problems. 
As one of the leading occupational forces in Europe, the British government was 
the first to realize the potential of the DP camps to ease domestic troubles. By offering 
the DPs resettlement as immigrant workers, Attlee’s government sought to accomplish 
several things – ease the acute labor shortage in industry and domestic service in Britain; 
end the financial burden on British taxpayers of supporting UNRRA; and rebuild the 
British population based on racial and ideological beliefs of British identity.  The 
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians best met these criteria and their experiences 
exemplify Britain’s solution to the refugee problem. The Balts viewed living in Britain as 
a temporary exile and not permanent resettlement. The Labour government, on the other 
hand, expected the DPs to eagerly accept British citizenship. Although the British 
government favored the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians as potential citizens, the 
need for workers forced immigration officials to expand the criteria for resettlement.  It 
would not be until the failure to fill recruitment quotas that the British Foreign Office 
would broaden the immigration criteria to include DPs of other nationalities.  
After the war, the era of Britain’s imperial greatness came to a slow end – a fact 
that the nation’s political leaders and ruling figures steadfastly, but understandably, 
refused to acknowledge. In The Audit of War: the Illusion and Reality of Britain as a 
Great Nation, historian Correlli Barnett argues that the British refused to give up on their 
childhood fantasies of their role as the head of the great nation-states. Government 
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leaders thought their nation suffered from short-term weaknesses in the wake of wartime 
sacrifices and resolved to restore Britain’s traditional world role.115 Restitution of 
Britain’s former greatness relied heavily on the maintenance of its role as a great power 
abroad supported by a quickly resuscitated society and strong economy at home.   
As part of their 1945 election campaign, Attlee and the Labour Party promised the 
people of Britain that their government would provide for all their needs. It became 
quickly apparent, however, that campaign promises of a return to traditional social roles 
for workers on the domestic front and soldiers overseas clashed with the reality of 
postwar needs. In her study on the role of gender in this period of postwar reconstruction, 
Elizabeth Wilson argues that “from the beginning, the Attlee government was attempting 
a weird juggling feat, trying to promote ideals of family life [by encouraging women to 
leave the workforce and become mothers and homemakers] while simultaneously 
desperately in need of labor for the work of peacetime reconstruction.”116  
Sectors of the economy hardest hit by the labor shortage included the production 
of raw materials such as steel, iron, coal, as well as food production, transportation, the 
newly established National Health Service, and domestic service in private homes.117 In 
1947, The Times reported the government’s assessment of the situation as “extremely 
serious,” quoting Sir Stafford Cripps’s pronouncement of an overall labor shortage of 
750,000 people.118 The same report proposed bringing women back into the workplace 
through recognition of their social and economic value – recognition that the 
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International Labor Organization described as “serving the cause of democracy” and 
“promoting the general welfare [of the nation].”119 Historian Linda McDowell, however, 
found that in spite of these efforts, the working population in the United Kingdom fell by 
1.38 million from 1945 to 1946. This drop was due largely to the withdrawal of wartime 
laborers from the workplace and the emigration of workers to Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada.120  Another solution considered far more useful was the recruitment of 
workers from the DPs camps in the British occupied zones of Germany.  
The recruitment of DPs as foreign workers was a practical solution to a fast 
growing problem. Attlee’s government was finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its 
financial support of UNRRA and the DP camps.121 Concerned for its reputation as a 
leading world power, the Attlee government withdrew its support from UNRRA when 
faced with their inability to support the international organization. Fortunately, 
opportunity arose in Germany as more and more officials turned their attention to the 
untapped labor supply available within the very camps causing so much difficulty. In 
1946, the Ministry of Labour established the Foreign Labour Committee (FLC) to 
“examine, in the light of existing manpower shortages, the possibility of making 
increased use of foreign labor, particularly in essential industries which are now finding 
special difficulty in recruiting labor.”122  Hasty plans for the recruitment and resettlement 
of the DPs were underway once officials such as the FLC chairman and Lord Privy Seal 
Arthur Greenwood announced their commitment to the incorporation of large groups of 
immigrants to fill the labor deficit. The need for haste came from Minister of Labour, 
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George Isaacs, who desired to begin recruitment quickly before other host countries 
“skimmed off” the “cream” of the refugee crop.123 As one writer at the time put it, 
“Britain was crying out for labor and here it was at her door, ready and willing.”124  
Britain now had the chance to help others while helping themselves. 
Government officials argued that the best way to aid the DPs was to follow the 
ancient dictum and help them to help themselves. By providing the DPs a way out of the 
camps, the British government would not only ease the financial burden on the nation’s 
economy, but also provide the refugees with the chance to build new lives and begin 
again.  According to Sir William Sholto Douglas, Marshal of the Royal Air Force and 
Commander-in-Chief of the British Occupational Zone in Germany, it would be 
impossible to expect the DPs to rebuild their lives without allowing them the opportunity 
to work for themselves. Not only was this enforced laziness “bad for them” given the 
“scarcity of labor in the world,” it was morally wrong. In short, Douglas concluded that 
the “time had come for [the DPs] to justify their existence.”125 In this line of thinking, 
honest paid labor provided the means for those with nothing to regain their dignity as 
human beings and thus their place in society as useful citizens.126  
Ideologically, Britain wanted to give hope to thousands by providing them with 
the promise of a new and secure life.  DPs were recruited as European Volunteer Workers 
(EVWs) – a term that “created the impression of a hardy citizen offering his or her 
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services to help Britain in its time of need,” rather than that of a wartime refugee whom 
no other country would take.127   
The FLC introduced the first resettlement scheme, known as the ‘Balt Cygnet’ 
(the English term for a young swan, meant to denote purity and grace) in April 1946.128  
The initial provision of the scheme was to allow for the recruitment of 1,000 young, 
unattached women from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to work in understaffed TB 
sanatoriums and in other areas of domestic service. Host countries often singled out 
Baltic DPs as the most desirable for immigration among the different nationalities within 
the DP camps. According to Vincent E. Slatt, the Balts consisted of “intellectuals, 
professionals, and highly skilled persons” compared to the largely peasant population of 
Polish refugees.129 A survey of occupations in the camps showed “four times as many 
former professors from the Baltic nations as from Poland, and nine times more than from 
the Ukraine.”130 The Balts establishment of numerous study centers and universities in 
Germany including the UNRRA University at Hamburg favorably impressed visiting 
officials.131 Here was the very type of industrious and hardworking people that British 
officials hoped to recruit as future citizens.  
The initial recruitment through the ‘Balt Cygnet’ scheme of only single and 
unattached Baltic women reflected Labour’s ideals of female and British identity. The 
very term, ‘Balt Cygnet,’ was carefully chosen by recruiters to portray the vulnerability 
and beauty of the women recruited – “a vision of young swans, redolent in purity, sailing 
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across the water” towards the new lives that awaited them.132 As well as being young and 
single, women who were potential EVWs had to pass several medical examinations – 
including questions of menstruation cycles (in large part to determine if they were 
pregnant at the time) and, in some instances, gynecological exams. If diagnosed as 
unhealthy, they were not accepted. Several former EVWs shared instances where the 
medical personnel examining them nevertheless passed those who were not fully healthy. 
One even recalled the doctor, to whom she listed the various illnesses she had while 
living in the camps, passing her anyway and telling her to deny she knew anything about 
being sick.133 First and foremost, these women were to be workers, and needed to be 
physically as well as mentally fit to meet certain standards of acceptability before they 
would be welcomed as naturalized Britons. 
Ministry of Labour officials traveled to the DP camps in the autumn of 1946 to 
assess firsthand the qualifications of the potential laborers. Following their return, the 
FLC issued a memorandum that included the officials’ review of the camps and listed in 
“unambiguous terms” the advantages of Baltic women as proposed immigrants. 134 The 
memorandum declared the Baltic women of “good appearance” and “scrupulously clean 
in their persons and habits.”135 The report further assured government leaders that there 
was little doubt that the women selected for immigration would be an “exceptionally 
healthy and fit body … and would constitute a good and desirable element in [the British] 
population.”136 They openly acknowledged the superiority of the Baltic women over 
other nationalities in the camps and foresaw their quick assimilation into British society. 
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Once in Britain, these women found themselves scattered across the United Kingdom, 
sometimes in small groups, other times by themselves. The goal of placement was not 
only to bolster the falling number of domestic workers, but also to force the DPs to 
assimilate through contact with other Britons. 
The British public soon learned of the scheme. Acceptance of the incoming 
refugees as both people in need and future neighbors was actively encouraged by the 
government, the press, and many employers who saw the promising opportunity of hiring 
cheap labor. Numerous sympathetic stories ran in The Times describing the dismal 
conditions of life in the camps, the helplessness of the displaced persons, and the cruel 
fate that awaited them if they returned home to Soviet control. One correspondent 
described a crowd of hopeful immigrants at one of the many recruitment centers in 
British-occupied Germany as “overjoyed when they heard that the British Government” 
decided to “offer some of them employment.”137 By establishing that the Baltic 
immigrants represented the intelligentsia of the Baltic countries, journalists assured 
readers that Britain would accept only the brightest and best-educated of the refugees as 
immigrants. Journalists also mentioned that only after passing a thorough examination by 
a selection board and medical personnel were DPs accepted as immigrants.138  All of 
these measures were taken to reassure the British public that the admission of the 
displaced persons would cause no harm, but instead benefited the nation above all else. 
 As for the choice of recruiting DPs in the ‘Balt Cygnet’ for domestic service, this 
was not only a vague attempt to revitalize a profession which modern household 
conveniences were making obsolete. It also served as a type of bridging occupation to 
                                                 
137 Times, “Displaced Persons for England: Women of Baltic States,” 24 July 1946. 
138 Ibid. 
 56
introduce the DPs into British society through its most important members – the middle 
and upper classes.139 In her study of domestic service and the middle class, British 
historian Nicky Gregson points out that prior to 1914 and the outbreak of the First World 
War, domestic service was one of the chief occupations open to those in the working 
class. Domestic service provided not only a source of income, but also the possibility of 
advancement for ambitious servants who could learn how to act in both high and low 
social environments.140 By working as maids in the cultured households of British society, 
the belief followed that the women recruited to fill these positions could quickly learn 
through imitation how to be good Britons. One goal of resettlement was the quick 
assimilation of immigrant workers into British culture. In promoting the ‘Balt Cygnet’ 
scheme, however, recruiters failed to realize that the same reasons which caused 
declining numbers in domestic service before the war – the demanding reality of life in 
domestic service, the increasing availability of jobs outside of service, and the production 
of labor-saving devices for the home – would also influence immigrant workers whether 
to stay in service or leave to pursue other employment. 
  By January 1947, it was becoming clear that the ‘Balt Cygnet’ scheme and the 
relatively small number of immigrants it succeeded in bringing to Britain were not 
enough to solve the labor shortage. There were simply not enough foreign workers under 
such a limited scheme to make any real economic contribution.141 The Economic Survey 
of 1947 recognized foreign labor as “the only substantial additional source of man-
power” available for Britain.  Prejudices and arguments against foreign workers were “no 
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longer valid” as there was “no danger for years to come that foreign labor … [would] rob 
British workers of their jobs.”142  
 Then there came another plan. The aptly named ‘Westward Ho!’ scheme targeted 
“men aged between eighteen and forty-four and women aged eighteen to forty-nine.”143 
Recruiters focused on not only Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, but also Ukrainians, 
Poles, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavians. The new scheme recruited men 
primarily for hard labor in mining, clay pits, steel, and agriculture. It recruited women for 
work in the textile industry as well as in agriculture, ceramics, wool, hosiery, domestic 
work, midwifery, and nursing. This scheme alone would bring 78,500 workers and their 
families into Britain.144 
 As with any government scheme, with supporters also came detractors.  
Opposition in political circles grew out of fear of uncontrolled immigration and the 
consequent permanent resettlement of thousands of foreigners. Opponents of the scheme 
rejected the idea that the continuance of permanent and unchecked immigration would 
solve Britain’s labor problems. In an independent report released in 1948, the Political 
and Economic Planning group concluded “there was not so much a shortage of 
manpower as an urgent need to redistribute it: new labor-saving techniques should be 
introduced, and immigration should be used merely as a temporary and flexible 
expedient.”145 The group feared that the continuous influx of immigrants would result in 
the loss of jobs for native British workers in favor of cheaper labor, as well as lower 
wages. This would ultimately result in too few jobs for too many workers. 
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 More persuasive, and potentially damaging, opposition came from public opinion 
– in particular, from among the working class and the labor unions. With the victory of 
the Labour party and the creation of the welfare state, coupled with the acute manpower 
shortage which allowed laborers to make demands on employers, the power of the labor 
unions increased. Union membership reached a record 8.8 million by 1946.146 According 
to a leading article in the January 1946 edition of the respected The Economist, the 
consequence of this increase was “the universal reluctance [of workers] to do a hard 
day’s work.”147 With too few workers and for too many jobs, laborers could easily afford 
to work on their terms and not their employers’. The influx of new foreign laborers as 
competition for jobs challenged this scenario and consequently did not sit well with many 
members of the working class. The Attlee Government knew that the support of the 
working class public was necessary in order for resettlement to be a success.  They also 
knew that in order for the government to remain in power they needed the continued 
support of their principal backers.148 British workers needed assurance that the 
immigrants posed no threat to their jobs. The government campaigned to win them over 
to this idea.   
 The Times ran articles assuring their readers that on arrival, the European 
Volunteer Workers would “be used only for work for which suitable British workers” 
could not be found and that their pay rates and working conditions would remain the 
same as for British workers.”149 Other articles described the recruitment process in detail, 
paying close attention to the poor conditions of the DPs camps (described most often as 
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“unbearable,” “filthy,” and “confining”) in order to gain sympathy for the EVWs. Still 
more stories served to show the supposed effortless adaptability of EVWs into their new 
homes and workplaces. Also prominently featured were their contributions as new 
members of British society and the level of acceptance they received from their 
employers and fellow workers. Articles painted the labor unions as selfish, “vigilant [only] 
in their members’ interest,” and detrimental to Britain’s continued growth and success in 
the government’s effort to shame the unions into a more charitable frame of mind.150  
 In general, male immigrants appeared a greater threat to job security and peace of 
mind than female immigrants, whom most viewed more as potential wives and 
mothers.151 Though many British workers continued their resistance to the EVWs, the 
Baltic immigrants tended to receive a greater degree of acceptance in Britain than Poles 
or ethnic Germans who also came over through the ‘Westward Ho!’ program. In some 
cases, the Baltic immigrants actually helped build and strengthen the labor unions, but 
overall acceptance was slow.152 As late as 1959, the government received letters from 
across Britain complaining about the “displacement of ‘British’ workers” and “the 
preferential treatment given to foreigners.”153 
 Immigrants who applied for resettlement and were accepted did not, of course, 
fully know what opportunities awaited them in Britain. Rather than recruit workers for 
specific jobs, the FLC decided to speed up the process and accept applicants based on 
general qualifications of education, physical health, and labor skills rather than whether 
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they would have a place to work once in Britain.154 According the British historian, 
Kathleen Paul, in her study of race and gender in postwar Britain, “At its smoothest, the 
whole process from interview to placement could be completed in a month.” It was the 
coordinated effort of several government departments “ranging from the Home and 
Foreign Offices, the Ministries of Labour, Transport, and Health, through the National 
Service Hostels and the National Assistance Board.”155 The new arrivals had everything 
provided and paid for by the government, from their transportation and job placement to 
food and clothing. The Ministry of Labour also encouraged British employers to visit the 
camps to recruit laborers themselves. The European resettlement schemes imported an 
impressive 91,000 foreign workers by the end of 1947. 156  
Upon arrival, the European Volunteer Workers settled into their assigned jobs. 
Most found their work difficult but at first remained grateful for the opportunity and tried 
to make the best of their situations. Within months of their arrival, however, many felt 
dissatisfied with their employment and few stayed once the option to leave opened to 
them. Often sent to small villages and towns in sparsely populated regions, they soon 
grew bored with the tedium of hard and repetitious work. Few interacted with their 
British coworkers and neighbors, preferring the company of others like them to mingling 
with people they saw as strangers and, in some cases, beneath them.   
 The Baltic workers, who came from largely middle class, highly-educated 
backgrounds, found little common ground with their British neighbors. Their own view 
of themselves as “political asylum seekers” unlike the state’s view of them as “economic 
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migrants” further separated them from the British working class.157  For those in areas 
with no other immigrants of similar backgrounds to talk to, the loneliness and isolation 
could be unbearable. One worker later recalled living “completely on [her] own” while 
working in a small rural hospital in Scotland as incredibly lonely.158   
 Other immigrants recalled feeling socially marginalized with little to no 
understanding of Britain’s laws or their rights as workers. In one such case, a worker 
described how her ignorance of her rights allowed others to take advantage of her. 
Working from seven in the morning to nine or ten o’clock at night, she was given few 
breaks or time alone to herself – as she states, in “domestic service in those days there 
were no trade unions. People could ask you to work any hours they like[d] and they 
did.”159 Legally bound to remain in their new occupations for at least two years, most 
wanted to leave and find new employment elsewhere. Some could not wait so long and 
simply left. The Ministry of Labor did little to those who reneged on their agreement to 
remain for the full two year period. The law required each EVW desiring a transfer to 
another position or another town to register under their new residences in a nominal effort 
to keep track of them. The Ministry of Labour concluded that since the EVWs were not 
slave laborers, they had every right to leave situations they found miserable.160  
 Though each immigrant signed a contract agreeing to remain a full year at their 
place of employment, lack of enforcement and the fact that records of their movements 
were not strictly kept made leaving one situation for another relatively simple. One 
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Latvian worker recalled the guilt she felt when, in order to get permission to move to 
another county with a large community of Latvians, she told her employer she had a 
fiancé in the place where she wanted to go and wished to join him there: “I felt awful 
really, I should have stayed at least a year […] I almost died really, from shame. I thought 
they will find out and I’ll be put in prison. But no one said anything and I started to 
work.”161 For the EVWs living with others of similar backgrounds was important not 
only for cultural reasons, but for simple companionship. Her obvious shame at deceiving 
her employer and her fear of arrest for leaving on false pretences shows how the EVWs 
were largely ignorant of their own rights and still feared deportation either to the DP 
camps or back to Soviet control.   
Because of volatile British-Soviet relations regarding the Baltic people, the 
Ministry of Labour worked to avoid any Soviet accusation of the resettlement schemes 
being little more than government sanctioned slave labor.162 To do so, official 
government policy determined that the EVWs should become full British citizens, not 
merely asylum seekers or temporary workers. To this end, those who applied for 
resettlement had to meet the qualifications of what the government believed it meant to 
be British.  These racial and ideological stereotypes favored white foreigners over dark-
skinned immigrants from India and the Caribbean as better suited for and more easily 
assimilated into British culture and society.  
The persuading of average British laborers that new immigrant workers were no 
threat to them, while simultaneously combating Soviet accusations of Britain’s 
recruitment of slave labor, was a formidable exercise in public relations for the Labour 
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government. Yet for all their difficulty in making the public accept the EVWs as fellow 
countrymen, the immigrants themselves thwarted Labour’s efforts.  The simple fact of the 
matter was that the majority of the EVWs viewed their lives in Britain as a type of 
temporary exile, rather than permanent settlement. From interviews with former EVWs, 
such as those conducted by Linda McDowell for Hard Labour, and personal memoirs, 
one can assume that the Baltic EVWs viewed British citizenship warily. The idea of 
citizenship implied not only access to the rights and privileges enjoyed by the native 
population, but also the assumption of a new cultural and national identity.163  Though 
this assumption of identity was encouraged by the government, the Baltic EVWs had no 
desire to intermarry with the native population, instead keeping to the company of others 
like them. McDowell argues that “stripped of their citizenship rights [by their countries’ 
loss of independence] and mourning their vanished homelands, the reconstruction of a 
national identity in exile was the central aim rather than assimilation into an unknown, 
and … unchosen, nation.”164 With the hope of soon returning home, they formed a 
cultural world separate from Britain’s by marrying, raising children, and preserving their 
common heritage. As the years passed, however, it became obvious that for the time 
being no move against the Soviets to free the Baltic countries would soon occur. 
By the late 1950s and 1960s, the immigrants realized that further resistance to 
citizenship seemed, as one EVW later put it, “a bit silly.”165 The main reason for finally 
accepting citizenship was practical rather than ideological. When it was evident that they 
would not be returning home any time soon, the Balts had to look towards their more 
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permanent futures. The only way to advance in their careers and in society was to blend 
in, to officially become Britons.  Speaking of the event over half a century later, one 
EVW recalled when she and her husband became citizens on the advice of their banker. 
She remembers how her husband initially refused, saying that he would not “sell his 
citizenship” for the sake of advancing his career. However, things became much better 
for her and her husband once they did apply and looking back at the situation, it seemed 
childish that they refused as long as they did.  As she put it, “you can’t change yourself; 
nobody is going to change you when you are a British subject.”166   
 Overall, British reactions to the refugee crisis in Europe following the Second 
World War were based on several factors – the maintenance of Britain’s role as a world 
power (however declining), the rebuilding of society and culture based on widespread 
methods of reform, economic need and financial concerns, and ideological values.  The 
acceptance of displaced persons from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as European 
Volunteer Workers exemplified Britain’s handling of the refugee crisis, while resolving 
the domestic labor shortage. The ‘Balt Cygnet’ and the later ‘Westward Ho!’ immigration 
schemes illustrate the process through which Europeans who had lost everything received 
the chance to start again as new British citizens. To the Attlee government, they 
represented a people who would quickly assimilate into British culture.  
The British government viewed European immigrants as the best solution to their 
population problems, often portraying them as highly educated, hard-working individuals 
whom circumstances forced from their homes. Government leaders placed themselves in 
the role of benefactors, making efforts to persuade the British labor unions and public to 
accept the EVWs as new Britons. However, the Baltic EVWs themselves viewed their 
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situation much differently. Rather than assimilate, they desired to retain their cultural 
heritage by rebuilding exile communities within Britain, always with the hope of soon 
returning home.  The passage of time made this idea unrealistic and after many years, 
those who remained in the United Kingdom accepted the citizenship they had resisted for 
so long. 
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CHAPTER V  
AMERICA AND THE BALTIC DPs, 1945-1952 
 In a message to Congress dated 7 July 1947, President Truman emphasized the 
responsibility of the United States to aid in the rebuilding of Europe including the 
resettlement of the Displaced Persons. Facing strong opposition from nativist politicians, 
veterans’ leagues fearing competition with returning veterans over jobs, and a suspicious 
and weary American public, Truman urged congress “not [to] forget that our Nation was 
founded by immigrants many of whom fled opposition and persecution.” Extolling the 
overall virtues of accepting the DPs as immigrants into the United States, Truman 
described the DPs as “hardy and resourceful” survivors of persecution and fate. “These 
are people,” he declared, “who oppose totalitarian rule and who because of their burning 
faith in the principles of freedom and democracy have suffered untold deprivation and 
hardship. Because they . . . are opposed to Communism, they have staunchly resisted all 
efforts to induce them to return to Communist-controlled areas.”167 President Truman 
appealed strongly to America’s love of freedom and democracy by portraying the DPs as 
courageous in the face of hardship, and by playing on growing fear of communism. It 
would take three years until a comprehensive immigration law, known as the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, allowed mass immigration from Europe to the United States. The 
so-called ‘Baltic Preference’ within this act once again placed the Baltic DPs among the 
most sought-after immigrants. 
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 The reason for delay in passing immigration measures to deal with the European 
crisis stemmed mainly from America’s nativism, the belief that Europe’s problems 
should not become the United States’ problems. Though experiencing the greatest 
economic growth in its history, the American public still remembered the hardships of the 
Great Depression. Americans would send money and aid, organize relief groups, support 
UNRRA and the United Nations, but inviting immigrants in was asking too much.  
 Although Truman wanted the United States to lead the rest of the Allied countries 
by its words and actions, the passage of the new immigration law by Congress was an 
embarrassing uphill struggle. Replacing the restrictive policies of the 1920s and 1930s 
proved such a slow process that, according to one writer for The New York Times in 
October 1946, the possibility of emigration from the DP camps seemed to be “constantly 
dwindling.”168  
 It should not have been a surprise to the American public. The United States 
government made plans for a postwar refugee crisis as early as 1943, when President 
Franklin Roosevelt helped coordinate the creation of UNRRA in an international effort to 
handle the inevitable refugee crisis following the end of the war. Roosevelt also took 
early measures at home to supply assistance, on a limited scale, to refugees fleeing Nazi 
persecution. The Roosevelt Administration slightly relaxed immigration policies 
following the fall of France to the Nazis in 1940. He also instructed his Advisory 
Committee on Refugees to compile a list of prominent intellectual and highly placed 
refugees, instructing the State Department to issue visitor visas for those important 
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individuals. Ultimately, these refugees used only a third of the 3,268 visas issued.169 
Roosevelt even went so far as to establish a temporary haven for these refugees in 
Oswego, New York. Run by the War Relocation Authority, the same group in charge of 
the Japanese-American internment camps, Oswego provided only temporary shelter, not 
a permanent solution.170  
 Roosevelt saw the need to act towards a solution to the approaching refugee 
problem, but the rest of United States remained unconvinced. The fear of losing one’s job 
or livelihood to foreigners pervaded American thinking. A report by the Committee for 
the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe, in 1947, noted that from 1933 to the end 
of the war, the U.S. accepted only a quarter of a million immigrants from Axis-controlled 
countries.171 Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s concessions to Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin as 
part of the Yalta Agreement in 1945 created an even greater postwar refugee crisis than 
originally planned. By handing over control of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union in 
exchange for their help against Japan, the United States betrayed its own principles, 
leaving thousands unwilling or unable to return to their homes.   
 Following Roosevelt’s sudden death in April 1945, Truman’s decision to drop the 
Atomic bombs on Japan brought the Pacific war to an abrupt close. He now faced the 
difficult process of restoring order. As decided at Yalta, Stalin demanded the immediate 
return of all refugees belonging to those countries annexed by the Soviet Union. Faced 
with caring for the nearly seven million refugees in Europe, the U.S. initially complied. 
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The majority of refugees returned willingly, but it quickly became apparent that nearly a 
million “die-hards” would not return to their now Soviet controlled homelands.  
 The U.S. military forcibly repatriated thousands of captured Soviet soldiers, 
Russian citizens captured fighting for Germany, and Russian refugees. Rumors of their 
fates, however, soon took its toll on American soldiers and served to strengthen a 
growing distrust of the communist government. Witnesses reported stories of the mass 
execution, deportation, and imprisonment of those repatriated. In Ruins of the Reich¸ 
historian Douglass Botting recounts the despair of those sentenced to repatriate. Many 
committed suicide, others seized weapons and fought back, still more tried emotional 
appeals sent directly to the Allied commanders. Eventually the sheer volume of human 
misery witnessed by the Allied soldiers took its toll.172 Allied commanders soon began 
refusing to send Soviet prisoners-of-war and other refugees back by force. General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower formally questioned the policy and ended the practice in the 
American zone of Germany by September 1945.173  
 The disorder in Germany, exacerbated by the DPs who attacked their former 
oppressors or fought to remain free of Soviet control, created a disturbing coldness 
amongst American soldiers and leadership towards the DPs. According to historian Roger 
Daniels, “a desire for order and efficiency . . . produce[d] among Army officers and other 
American officials unfeeling if not downright callous actions and re-actions towards the 
DPs.”174 Their continued presence hindered rebuilding efforts and stabilization. The DP 
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situation grew desperate as thousands of refugees from Eastern Europe poured into the 
American Occupational Zone of Germany to escape the Soviets. The DP camps, 
established by UNRRA, quickly filled with “die-hard” refugees refusing to return home 
and demanding resettlement elsewhere. 
 Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, creator of the, later, famed Marshall Plan, 
claimed that America’s “responsibility as victors” included the resettlement of the DPs. 
Alternatives to resettlement included continued forcible repatriation or the closure of the 
DP camps and “turning those victims of the Germans back to the Germans.”175 The 
continual maintenance of the DP camps, Marshall continued, would degrade the DPs in 
their own eyes as well as in others: “To continue to hold these people where there is no 
opportunity to help themselves and without hope of such opportunity is contrary to that 
American Tradition [of self-improvement].”176 According to Marshall, the United States 
was in the best position to help the DPs and should set an example for others by resolving 
the issue quickly. 
  Military commanders and relief workers in Europe grew increasingly frustrated 
with America’s refusal to act. Earl G. Harrison, in his report to President Truman on the 
conditions of the camps, concluded that if the United States would take action towards 
resettlement, other countries might “be willing to keep their doors reasonably open for 
such humanitarian considerations.”177 Harrison urged Washington to set an example and 
secure its position as a world leader. The camps provided no permanent solution to the 
DPs.  
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 The real difficulty, Truman found, was getting the traditionally isolationist 
American public to share his point of view. The politics of immigration during the 1920s 
and 1930s were strongly conservative. Far right-wing politicians succeeded in passing the 
first restrictive immigration laws in American history in 1924, considered by some 
historians as the peak of nativism in American politics. This law limited the number of 
immigrants to set quotas per year from each European country. In 1945 a number of 
congressmen went so far as to introduce legislation that would cut the 1924 immigration 
quotas in half for the next ten years to prevent the massive immigration of wartime 
refugees.178  
 The American public in 1945 appeared to side with the nativists on the issue of 
immigration. A 1945 Gallup poll asked three questions: should America allow in more 
European immigrants, the same number, or less than before the war. Thirty-seven percent 
said fewer; thirty-two percent said the same, while only five percent said more. Fourteen 
percent had no opinion.179 The issue of resettlement could not, however, be ignored. Not 
only was America’s humanitarian reputation at stake, but also its position as one of the 
two emerging superpowers in the world.  
 The continuing debate with Britain over the fate of the Jewish DPs revealed 
America’s hypocritical stance as long as it continued to close its doors to resettlement. 
Truman wrote to the newly elected Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, supporting Jewish 
immigration to Palestine and urging the PM to act accordingly. The British responded by 
pointing out that America’s refusal to aid the DPs by allowing them access to its shores. 
Yes, America accepted a select number of prominent refugees, according to the British 
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newspaper New Statesman, referring to President Roosevelt’s wartime directives, but 
when it came to “the broken human wrecks” left behind, they made little effort to help.180 
The British could afford to make such criticisms since they accepted refugees on a 
limited scale beginning in 1946.  
 At home, many in the popular press joined the call for action. According to an 
editorial in The Washington Post on 9 September 1946, the fact that Americans, 
committed themselves to caring for the DPs as long as they remained in their camps and 
while exhorting other countries to accept them as immigrants, set a “precedent dangerous 
to . . . [her] cherished values” by refusing resettlement.181 In the 1 February 1947 issue of 
The Saturday Evening Post, the writer appealed to the public’s sense of pride and reason 
to persuade them to favor immigration. 
  If our efforts to protect these people in their right to asylum in Europe are  
  anything more than wind, we are bound to consider whether or not some  
  of them could come to our shores without evasion of immigration quota  
  restriction. Careful screening would of course be necessary, but surely a  
  nation whose population is mainly composed of immigrants and their  
  descendants cannot logically maintain that the only ‘good’ immigrants are  
  those who are already here.182 
 
Still others tried ‘shame tactics’ to spur action. Life Magazine, in its 23 September 1946 
issue, editorialized that the “most shocking fact about the plight of these displaced 
persons is not that they are interned. It is the fact that the United States Government and 
people have the means to open the door for many of them but have not done so.”183 
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Although these appeals reached their audience, resistance to immigration remained 
stubborn. 
 President Truman took firmer action. From September to October 1947, the 
Subcommittee of the House of Foreign Affairs visited 150 DP camps in Europe to 
evaluate the situation and make recommendations for further action. They returned in 
agreement that repatriation had indeed failed and resettlement provided the only 
solution.184 “The immensity of the problem of displaced persons and refugees,” Truman 
declared, “is almost beyond comprehension. This period of unspeakable human distress is 
not the time for us to close or to narrow our gates.”185 With this statement, Truman 
announced a new immigration plan, the Truman Directive. This plan established an 
emergency measure for 40,000 visas per year issued to select DPs. Ultimately the 
Directive issued 35,515 visas.186 Though failing to reach its visa quota, the Directive did 
accomplish some procedural changes by allowing cultural and religious charities the right 
to provide affidavits for DPs, a right previously given only to an immigrant’s relatives.187  
 The real accomplishment of the Truman Directive, however, was to force 
Congress to formally address the issue of resettlement and the need for new immigration 
laws. The introduction of the Stratton Bill on 1 April 1947 placed the issue of the 
displaced persons squarely before Congress for the first time.188 The Stratton Bill 
proposed that, for four years, 100,000 DPs be allowed into the United States. Inherently, 
the bill was simple. According to historian Robert Divine, the bill required only that the 
DPs meet the existing immigration requirements while giving preference to the close 
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relatives of war veterans and American citizens.189 As expected, the bill met with 
immediate opposition as well as support.  
 The press favored the bill as the first positive step in solving the huge European 
refugee problem, while living up to America’s wartime pledge. Organized labor, by 
supporting the bill, surprised the isolationists. William Green, President of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) believed that the situation of the DPs “justified a temporary 
departure from . . . [the] quota policy.”190 Although still supported by major veterans’ 
organizations and numerous patriotic societies, the loss of union support made isolationist 
politicians seriously consider the bill’s proposals.191 Forced to acknowledge the need for 
a new immigration policy, they resolved to fight long and hard to make that policy as 
restrictive as possible. The Cold War and growing fear of communism aided these efforts. 
Continuous debate and opposition stalled the passage of the bill for nearly a year until the 
Senate pushed through an even more restrictive bill on 2 June 1948.  
 The new Wiley-Revercomb Bill, presented by Senator Alexander Wiley of 
Wisconsin and Senator Chapman Revercomb of West Virginia, allowed for only 50,000 
DPs per year for two years. Of those admitted, the bill demanded that fifty percent have 
agricultural backgrounds with preference given to those coming from the Baltic region. 
But the bill established a cutoff date for eligibility. Only those DPs who arrived in the 
camps by 22 December 1945 could apply for resettlement. This prevented the majority of 
Jewish DPs, who fled from the pogroms in Poland in 1946, and those from largely 
Catholic countries such as Poland and the Ukraine from applying. Opponents 
immediately condemned the bill as blatantly anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic, which it was. 
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The Baltic preference solidified this idea as they made up the largest group of Protestants 
among the DPs.192 The result of both bills was a compromise in the form of the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948. 
 Revercomb chaired the committee in charge of writing the act. As historian Steve 
Neal points out, Revercomb viewed it as his duty as an American citizen to create a 
policy designed to keep all “undesirables” out.193 Regarding this position he stated, “We 
don’t want any security risks – anyone who is a Commie or Nazi – coming into the 
United States under the DP program.”194 To this end, they continued to press for the 
proposed cutoff date and agricultural preference as the best means to curb the rush of 
potential communist sympathizers from Eastern Europe and former Nazis fleeing the 
Eastern Front from entering the United States.  
 The Senate eventually reached a compromise in June 1948. However, the 
resulting legislation, the Displaced Persons Act, combined some of the worst features of 
the two competing bills.195 The Act authorized the admission of 250,000 DPs over the 
next two fiscal years. For immigration supporters, this number seemed too low 
considering that nearly a million DPs remained in the camps. The Act also required that 
thirty percent of entrance visas issued be reserved for agricultural workers (down from 
the earlier fifty percent) and up to fifty percent for those from the Baltic countries.196 The 
cutoff date stubbornly remained fixed at 22 December 1945 – those who arrived after this 
date were ineligible to come to the United States.197 In what was an “essentially face-
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saving measure,” the law kept the 1924 quota system, but allowed for quota mortgaging 
to increase the numbers allowed into the country.198 Mortgaging allowed the government 
to ‘borrow’ against future yearly quotas in order to admit as many DPs as possible within 
the time limit allowed by the DP Act. For instance, in one extreme case, the government 
mortgaged the Latvian quota of 286 immigrants per year up to the year 2274.199 
President Truman and the liberal supporters of immigration responded with 
indignation, anger, and dismay over the stubbornness of the Senate to present a more 
open policy. Both the cutoff date and the Baltic preference led to calls of discrimination 
with respect to Jews and Catholics. Those who proposed the Baltic preference acted on 
the assumption that the majority of these DPs came from agricultural backgrounds, which 
they did not. Although they comprised only twenty-five percent of the DP population, the 
Baltic DPs included the majority of Protestants.200 The isolationists accepted the idea of 
the Protestant, white farmers represented by the Baltic DPs as closest to the American 
ideal as established by the founding fathers. This ridiculous assumption added weight to 
the liberal argument that the DP Act embodied the backwardness of American politics in 
the postwar world. 
Earl G. Harrison, the American representative on the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees (established to deal with the situation in Europe), became one of 
the more vocal critics of the DP Act. Having witnessed first hand the aftermath of the 
Holocaust and the desperate situation of the Jewish survivors, he criticized the Act as the 
first discriminatory provision based on religion ever placed in U.S. Immigration law. 201 
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The blatant anti-Semitism in the provisions of the bill, to Harrison, shamed not only those 
who proposed it, but the United States as a whole in the eyes of the world.  
Unfortunately, the liberals had no other choice. With the congressional session 
about to end, a frustrated Truman reluctantly signed the Act, reasoning that he would 
rather pass some form of DP legislation than none.202 Echoing the President’s sentiments, 
the Kentucky Representative, a supporter of immigration, explained, “We had a gun 
barrel at our heads. That gun barrel was the element of time. . . . I repeat, it was either this 
compromise or nothing.”203  
The result was a policy so restrictive that it was almost impossible for the DPs to 
enter the country in a timely manner. Paperwork, health inspections, visas, and other 
measures confused both recruiters and the DPs. Mr. E.E. Swanston, director of war relief 
services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, related that the group’s submission 
of 50,000 job opportunities . . . [to] Washington failed due to administrative red tape. To 
gain admittance under the DP Act, each DP had to submit upwards of thirty different 
documents and get clearance from six different governmental agencies in order to gain a 
visa.204 Such security measures prompted the New York Times to report, “it is easier for a 
former Nazi to enter the United States than for one of the Nazis’ innocent victims.”205 
To help manage the process, Truman established the Displaced Persons 
Commission giving it authority to work with and authorize voluntary agencies in the 
transportation and settlement of the DPs. The Commission, chaired by three presidential 
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appointees, each with a background in immigration affairs and sympathetic to the 
refugees, worked to smooth the way for DP immigration. They passed further legislation 
allowing voluntary agencies to issue visas and transport DPs, provided the refugees gave 
assurance that they would not become “public charges” and thus a burden to taxpayers.206 
Truman hoped to speed up the immigration process by smoothing the way for volunteer 
and charitable organizations to directly recruit and sponsor the DPs.  
For the DPs, the selection process and the acquisition of American sponsor 
proved a difficult task. Like Britain, Canada, and Australia, the United States emphasized 
that only the best qualified DPs would be eligible for immigration. American health 
inspectors conducted exams throughout the DP camps checking for any signs of illness or 
handicap. A little girl, Marite Zidermanis, a Latvian DP, recalled how her mother made 
her put on her nicest clothes, checking her over for signs of lice, and braided her hair with 
ribbons before taking her to the health inspectors to get clearance for immigration.207 By 
all accounts, the Baltic DPs made a favorable impression on the recruiters due largely to 
their tidy appearance as well as their polite and well-educated manner. In general, 
inspectors did not accept DPs who did not appear healthy and clean, although there were 
numerous exceptions where doctors passed DPs for immigration out of pity.  
The DP Commission prioritized the issuance of visas based on economic need and 
occupation. Farmers, laborers, physicians, dentists, nurses, household domestics, clothing 
or garment workers, and aliens “possessing educational, scientific, or technical 
qualifications”, received first priority. Aliens with blood relations already in the United 
States received second priority, while all others classified as DPs received final 
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priority.208 Above all, to qualify for immigration to the United States, the DPs had to 
prove themselves useful and that they would not become burdens on society. The U.S. 
government required the DPs to provide assurance that they could acquire housing and 
employment without taking them from any American citizen.209 
According to historian Beth Cohen, in order for the DP to obtain the coveted visa 
they first needed a sponsor (individual or welfare agency) who provided an affidavit to 
the government promising that the DP would not become a public charge. The DP could 
receive the affidavit through one of three ways: “an individual affidavit (for a named 
relative); an agency or corporate affidavit [such as from the Lutheran Church for a named 
individual]; or, least common, an employer affidavit (unnamed).”210 Sponsors carried 
four responsibilities for each eligible DP: 
1. Assurance of suitable employment at not less than the prevailing rate 
of wages for like activity in the community where employed without 
displacing some other person from employment. 
2. Assurance of safe and sanitary housing for the person and members of 
his family who will accompany him and who propose to live with him 
without displacing some other person from such housing. 
3. Assurance that the displaced person and members of his family who 
accompany him and propose to live with him shall not become public 
charges. 
4. Assurance that the displaced person and members of his family will be 
properly received at the port of entry in the United States and 
transportation and en route expenses from such port to the place of 
destination shall be provided.211 
 
The government placed heavy emphasis on the DP not displacing the job or home of any 
American. Unlike Britain, where the government assumed responsibility for the EVWs 
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and required knowledge of their whereabouts, the DPs in America could move about 
freely so long as they paid their debts and provided for their own support. 
Thanks to the efforts of the DP Commission, volunteer organizations helped 
coordinate the necessary paperwork required to gain a visa as well as locate sponsors for 
the DPs cleared for immigration. The Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, American 
Quakers, the Christian Committee for Refugees, and the American Joint Distribution 
Committee worked to match individual sponsors with DPs. Other organizations, such as 
the International Red Cross, the National Refugee Service, and the International Rescue 
and Relief Committee, provided care and clothing bundles for the DPs and new arrivals. 
The Red Cross also served as a tracing bureau with a large central database to help 
European DPs find American relatives and other family members.212 The work of these 
charities became one of the most important means of bringing the DPs to America.   
These organizations made every effort to help the DPs, but always with the 
understanding that they were to begin helping and supporting themselves as quickly as 
possible. On this point, most of the Baltic DPs were in complete agreement. They did not 
want charity, many claimed, only the chance to start again. Efforts were made even for 
those ‘hard cases,’ mostly young mothers with children, the elderly or the handicapped, 
to help them bypass health inspections (if necessary), or to find sponsors willing to accept 
the burden of caring for them. Leida Sorro, an Estonian DP, was one of these ‘hard 
cases.’ While living in a DP camp, her husband died unexpectedly leaving her with four 
young children and little chance of finding a sponsor willing to support her and her 
family. Eventually, someone told her to seek help from the Methodist Church, known to 
take on difficult cases. “I visited the lady who was in charge of the Methodist office,” she 
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relates, “I knew so little English that I had to use sign language, but I had a good feeling 
about her. She said, ‘I would like to see your family.’ So I ran to the camp again . . . and 
made the children just so and came back with them. The lady looked at them. She had a 
beautiful smile. She said, ‘Of course we can help you.’”213 Determination, a good 
appearance, and a great deal of luck aided the Baltic DPs to take advantage of the 
preference given them through the Displaced Persons Act.  
The success and ease of individual sponsorship varied from person to person. The 
situation of Helga Zidermanis, another “hard case” DP from Latvia, illustrates the 
uncertainty involved in migrating to America from the DP camps. As the mother of five 
children under the age of twelve, Helga’s prospects for immigration to any of the 
resettlement countries, much less the United States, seemed small. When an American 
journalist who befriended her in one of the camps revealed that he had found her an 
American sponsor she was euphoric. She quickly wrote a letter to the sponsor, a 
Midwestern farmer, thanking him for his generosity. She received a chilling reply several 
weeks later. The farmer had been led to believe he was sponsoring six adults who could 
work as laborers on his farm and angrily withdrew his sponsorship. He would not support 
a large family who could do nothing for him in return.  
 Desperate, Helga sought the help of her journalist friend, relating to him her letter 
and the reply. Rather than sympathize, however, he belittled her naiveté and stupidity. Of 
course, he had lied to the sponsor in order to get her to America. How else did she think 
she could make it? “You’ve ruined your chances of ever getting to America,” he told her, 
“I can’t help you.” Later remorseful, the journalist agreed to find her another sponsor 
                                                 
213 Joan Morrison and Charlotte Fox Zabusky, American Mosaic: The Immigrant Experience in the Words 
of Those Who Lived It (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton, 1980), 252. 
 82
once she arrived in Dallas, Texas, where he lived. Within weeks, they crossed the 
Atlantic to begin again in the United States.214  
 Individuals who chose to directly sponsor DPs rather than work through a 
volunteer agency sometimes faced criticism from their local communities. Mirzda, a 
Latvian DP, recalled the kindness of the couple in Oklahoma who sponsored her and her 
husband to work for them on their farm in 1950. Through their correspondence, she 
learned that her sponsor's local community criticized them for “taking steps to place DPs 
in their employ,” but chose to sponsor them nonetheless. Their kindness was not lost on 
Mirzda and her husband.215 
 For its part, the US Government made efforts to prepare the DPs abroad for their 
migration to America and also to ease the assimilation process by starting a propaganda 
campaign aimed at “introducing” the DPs to the American people. American propaganda 
films at the time showed DP children in makeshift schools learning English for a normal 
life in a welcoming country. The films emphasized the charity and goodwill of the 
American people by portraying them as a prosperous and happy, always willing to help 
others. 
 As with any campaign, however, the effects of propaganda could prove damaging 
by raising expectations too high. A common complaint among recruiters in the camps 
was that the DPs held too rosy a picture of America as the Promised Land they saw in 
pictures and read about in stories. The hope of migrating to America even prevented 
numerous DPs from accepting offers to resettle elsewhere. According to Lieda Sorro, 
immediately after her husband’s death she received an offer to move to Sweden, but 
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turned it down. Though considered a “hard case” for settlement in America, she chose to 
remain in the camps and wait for her chance. “I had such a picture of it as a wonderland,” 
she said, “and I wanted to see it.”216 Attitudes such as these forced the continued 
existence of the camps and placed more burdens on the occupational authorities to 
provide for the DPs.  
 Stereotypes about America were difficult for the DPs to comprehend. This often 
led to amusing, sometimes bitter experiences once they reached their destinations. Anton 
Tamsaare, an Estonian DP, recalled his family’s first reactions on hearing that the 
Norwegian Lutheran Church was sending them to Moorehead, North Dakota. Thinking 
that North Dakota was an arctic region, the family prepared for the worst. “We thought 
we should take along everything we had,” Tamsaare recalled, “because they wouldn’t 
have anything – they would be underdeveloped, they would be moving by dogsled. So we 
took along a great deal of stuff, including our mattresses and bedding and furniture.”217 
On the other side, many Americans thought of the DPs as coming from underdeveloped, 
backward countries because of images portrayed in tracts and films produced by 
organizations such as the Catholic League and Lutheran Relief which showed images of 
the DPs as peasants from the previous century. 
 Regardless of their stereotypes, the first DPs arrived aboard The General Black on 
21 October 1948 carrying close to 700 DPs, a large percentage of whom were Balts. They 
were greeted by the Attorney General on behalf of President Truman who welcomed 
them as the “pilgrims of 1948 entering the historic gateway of freedom as did the 
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Pilgrims of 1620.”218 The DP spokesman responded, “Today we are liberated from every 
misery of existence in Europe and we thank you very much. We are born today the 
second time in our lives to a new life of freedom and new life of democracy. We thank 
you very much.”219 The sheer size and obvious material wealth of American culture 
overwhelmed the DPs. The number of skyscrapers and the countless automobiles on 
myriad highways awed them, but they remained appalled by the urban squalor. 
According to Algridas M. Budreckis, the vice president of the Lithuanian-American 
Community Incorporated, “the first impression was that America was sloppy and 
wasteful.”220 Leida Sorro recalled what she amusingly remembered as her first encounter 
with American culture while on a train to her final destination in the Midwest.  
I remember being on that train and seeing these kids, a few seats in front 
of us, playing with play money. We didn’t know it was play money. I’ll 
never forget that scene. There’s all this money falling around, and all we 
had for the five of us to eat with on the train for three days was twenty 
dollars. Finally, [my daughter] picked up a piece of the play money and 
we looked – twenty dollars! We thought it was real and here were these 
children, playing with all that money. We thought, “My God! It really is 
true; Americans really are rich.”221 
 
It was an abrupt change coming from the DP camps where nothing was wasted. 
Those DPs sponsored by individuals went to their final destinations immediately 
on their arrival. Those sponsored by agencies, however, were taken to welcoming centers 
where they remained until they found work and a permanent residence, although many 
DPs had the opportunity to refuse certain sponsors or placements in favor of others. One 
such couple from Latvia refused an immediate opportunity in Nebraska in favor of a 
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small town in upper New York State. There they were welcomed by a “welcome wagon 
hostess” and a “home prepared for them in every way,” filled with furniture, clothes, and 
food.222 Although the location of placements varied, the majority of the DPs ended up in 
the Midwestern and Southern states.  
 While some met with the hospitality and charity most expected from Americans, 
others experienced a more sobering reality. One Latvian woman assumed that everything 
was free, including food, clothes, and lodging, until she found a job. To her astonishment 
one day the pastor she stayed with gave her a bill for a thousand dollars for the three 
months she had lived with him and his wife. Fortunately, the man did not make her pay 
him right away but let her pay when she could.223 Others experienced the same situation, 
expecting free provisions when in truth they went into debt immediately upon their 
arrival. Their sponsors, they discovered, were willing to provide for them but not 
necessarily pay for them. Other DPs received a government loan to pay for transportation 
to their destinations, and to pay for food and other expenses until they began to work. 
These loans would be repaid as soon as possible.  
Every eligible member of the DP family worked regardless of professional 
background. Both husbands and wives typically worked one and two jobs in order to save 
money to repay their debts and achieve financial security.224 Finding well-paying jobs 
and good housing proved difficult for some. It was common in larger cities for several 
families to live crowded together in tenement houses until they could afford something 
better. In Indianapolis, Agate Nesaule, a Latvian DP, and her family, lived with a 
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minister and his wife until they found an apartment in a nearby tenement. The apartment 
building was dangerously over-crowded, but the landlady warned them against revealing 
that to any authorities unless they had somewhere cheaper to go.225 
Nevertheless, the DPs were eager to work, even if only at menial labor. 
Physicians, clergymen, and engineers fared better from the beginning, according to a 
study on contemporary immigration. While practically no teacher or lawyer avoided 
manual labor, physicians and engineers generally could start at white-collar jobs, prepare 
for and take state Medical Board exams, and eventually resume professional work.226 
Other DPs worked at undesirable jobs while taking courses to improve or develop skills 
in other more lucrative fields such as nursing, bookkeeping, and mechanics.227 
Occupational adjustment varied depending on the profession and knowledge of the 
English language and American social and political systems. According to June Dreening 
Holmquist, in her study on the various ethnic groups in Minnesota, two factors helped to 
diminish the “adverse impact of occupational adjustment” for professionals. Firstly, most 
DPs viewed any occupation as preferable to life in the DP camps. Secondly, the “higher 
standard of living in the United States and the rise in the individual’s economic status 
tended to compensate for a decline in social or occupational status.”228  
The former occupations of most professionals DPs no longer existed for them. 
This included most of the Baltic DPs. Though the majority had professional backgrounds, 
they could not find professional work. The very preference given them under the DP Act 
was based on the mistaken idea that they were farmers and blue collar workers. Tamsaare 
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recalled how his father, a highly placed political official in his native Estonia, found work 
only as a janitor because his political knowledge could not translate into American 
politics. This move from upper middle class to lower middle class disappointed 
Tamsaare’s parents a great deal, but they learned to deal with the reality of their 
situation.229  
As can be expected, the stories of the Baltic DPs varied from those who felt taken 
advantage of and those who had only kind words to say about their sponsors and 
experiences. Common features of the DPs’ initial experiences included working multiple 
jobs in order to save money to buy a house, car, or education for themselves or their 
children. Mirzda experienced her “first hand look at American generosity” with the death 
of her newborn son. Knowing that she and her husband had little money of their own, the 
people in their community paid for the funeral expenses and did what they could to help 
them through their grief.230 In other communities, local organizations helped the refugees 
assimilate, offering assistance in finding work, accommodations, friends and family 
members, even financial loans and job training. The DPs, for the most part, returned the 
kindness by being hard-working and reliable employees. Though this caused occasional 
complaints from American workers, employers seemed generally eager to hire DPs. On at 
least one occasion in Minnesota, a labor union complained that an employer was hiring 
too many non-unionized DPs and displacing union workers. The employer responded that 
the DPs proved better and more reliable. Providing the DPs with union cards, thus 
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assimilating them into the American working class, simply and logically resolved the 
matter.231 
The DPs sent to the Southern states fared worse than those in the Midwest. Living 
and work situations were generally poor. Ignorance of the DPs backgrounds enabled 
many farmers on secluded farms to feel superior to their well-educated workers. 
According to one Latvian DP, the one thing he would have changed about his situation on 
arrival was he would have learned English before he came. In the South, he stated a 
person’s accent would always separate him from the crowd and cause him to receive a 
“little bit different treatment.”232 Just as “blacks were outcasts and poorly treated,” so too 
were DPs with “strong accents or little English . . . rejected as acceptable white 
citizens.”233 
Experiences varied from person to person. Some found acceptance, while others 
did not. Many sponsors took advantage of the DPs’ situation, paying them little while 
charging them high prices for food and shelter. As Nesaule explains, it was difficult for 
the DP to reconcile the America they dreamed about in the camps with the reality they 
faced on their arrival. “The camps,” she states, “had been full of wonderful stories about 
the reception in America.” Stories of welcoming committees stocking the homes of DP 
families with food, clothes, and other essentials free of charge circulated among the DPs. 
All the stories promised that America had streets paved with gold. No one had “yet heard 
of the other stories of middle-aged former professors working in the cotton fields of 
Mississippi and being threatened with jail and deportation if they tried to leave.”234 
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Feelings of isolation and depression were inevitable given the situation of many DPs. For 
this reason, many moved to larger cities once they repaid their debts in the hopes of more 
opportunities and the presence of other former DPs who shared similar experiences. 
Despite these difficulties, the DPs soon adapted to American life and assimilated 
into the culture. This happened, in large part, through their children who were educated in 
American schools and grew up as Americans. The loss of status and wealth for the 
parents often translated into high expectations for their children to do well and succeed. 
For these parents, a college education for their children symbolized acceptance and 
success in America. Tamsaare remembers that he and his parents had “an understanding” 
that he was to be the best at whatever he chose to do. This he viewed as not only forging 
his own identity, but also repaying his parents for what they had experienced and the 
sacrifices they had made.235   
What the Baltic DPs desired in the United States was the chance to work and 
provide a life for themselves and their families. They hoped to preserve their cultural 
heritage while assimilating into American culture and be accepted as Americans and not 
as charity cases.  In Minneapolis, the Latvian and Estonian communities established 
religious and cultural centers where special celebrations, music festivals, and other 
activities took place to keep the memories of the past alive and give the younger 
generation a solid cultural foundation.236 In Chicago, the Lithuanian DPs created their 
own communities after clashing with older established Lithuanian groups. The settled 
Lithuanian community, whose families arrived in America the previous century, could 
not understand why the DPs chose not to return home when given the chance. The DPs, 
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on the other hand, could not communicate the horrors of Soviet occupation to those who 
had never experienced communism.  
America’s involvement in the DP situation in Europe took another step forward in 
1950. Five years had passed since the end of the war, yet the DP camps still existed in 
Europe. Congress passed an Amendment to the DP Act that suspended the quota system 
to solve the immediate problem of removing the large numbers of unsettled refugees. The 
presence of so many unstable people in Europe, proponents argued, might prove a 
destabilizing force in securing countries vital against the threat of communism. To 
quickly empty the camps, the Amendment also liberalized requirements by removing any 
trace of discrimination against Jews and Catholics caused by the early cutoff date.237 The 
DP Act expired in 1952 in favor of other immigration laws. This coincided with the 
closing of the final DP camps in Europe. In all, over seventy percent of those admitted 
under the Displaced Persons Act came from countries annexed by the Soviet Union. 
According to author John Higham, in a study of American attitudes towards 
immigration, by 1924 with the establishment of an immigration quota system “the old 
belief in America as a Promised Land for all who yearn for freedom had lost its operative 
significance.” Only after months and years of debate and persuasion did the situation 
begin to change. The Displaced Persons Act was the first “refugee” act in American 
history – written from necessity and the threat created by the Cold War. It was originally 
set to terminate in 1951, but Congress extended the deadline until June 30, 1952, to 
ensure the use of all authorized visas. In four years, America accepted 337,244 DPs as 
permanent residents. In all, 308 ships and 284 flights entered New York, New Orleans, 
and Boston carrying DPs and other refugees to their new homes.  
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In the study of the DPs and the resettlement schemes, of note concerning those 
who settled in the United States was their desire to assimilate rather than hold onto the 
belief that they would one day return home. They established cultural communities in 
many of the larger cities, although this proved more to create an emotional support 
system rather than a serious attempt to re-establish their homelands in America. Holding 
onto heritage was important for many parents who established weekend schools to teach 
their children their native languages and customs. However, the children were not 
generally discouraged from becoming American. The DPs who came to the United States 
were expected and often assisted to assimilate, unlike those DP communities in other 
resettlement countries which remained segregated from the native population. 
Experiences varied and disappointments abounded, but the majority of the Baltic DPs did 
not regret their decision. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE BALTIC DPs, 1947-1952 
 
In 1945, neither Canada nor Australia seriously considered the plight of the 
Displaced Persons in Europe. Like other members of the United Nations, both felt that 
repatriation would successfully solve the refugee problem by allowing everyone to return 
to their homes, happily and willingly. Of greater concern to leaders in both Canada and 
Australia was the severe labor shortage immediately after the war. Both countries looked 
to immigration for answers to dire predictions that at their current rate of population 
growth neither country would have enough people to fill the postwar labor shortage.  
 Initial schemes involved the resettlement of British ex-servicemen and women as 
the best means to boost population. The recruitment of British immigrants seemed natural 
to both Canadians and Australians who identified themselves through their British 
ancestry. The British government, however, began to actively discourage this migration 
fearing the effects of population loss in Britain. The failure of these initial schemes 
forced a re-evaluation of both Canadian and Australian national identity to combine the 
needs of the nation with the realities of the postwar situation. 
 To deal with the postwar crisis, both Australia and Canada established similar 
immigration plans. Based, in part, on their moral and financial obligations to the United 
Nations, both countries planned to take part in the resettlement of European refugees. 
Some had no homes to return to, while other refused to return to their Soviet-occupied 
homelands. Both countries turned to the DP camps to solve their population troubles 
when immigration from Britain alone could not meet labor demands. As with the British 
immigration schemes, Canadian and Australian officials turned to Baltic DPs as the most 
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desirable and the most easily assimilated among the refugees. Their interest was one-
sided, however. Neither Canada nor Australia ranked high on the majority of refugee’s 
list of desirable places to immigrate. Both had to present themselves in ways that would 
appeal to the DPs. This proved a difficult task for both. Although Australia presented 
itself as a spacious land of opportunity, the distance from Europe deterred many DPs who 
hoped to one day return home. Canada’s reputation as nothing more than “a few acres of 
snow” did nothing to boost its popularity among immigrants. Both Australian and 
Canadian Immigration officials promoted their countries as new lands of opportunity far 
away from war-torn Europe. Once there, the DPs would no longer need to worry about 
food, disease, or another war. With hard work, they could start again. In reality, with the 
United States still silent on the issue of resettlement the DPs had few choices in terms of 
resettlement. By 1947, the desire to leave the camps made Australia and Canada more 
appealing. 
In the 1930s, Australia faced a national population crisis. This was true at least 
according to those in parliament who debated the need to address the inevitable decline in 
the number and virility of Australia’s population. Arthur Calwell, future director of 
immigration, estimated that at its current rate of growth, Australia’s population would 
peak in 1970 and enter a long decline eventually dropping from seven to three million 
people.238 In his words, Australia’s enemies “need wait only a generation or two until we 
are so reduced in numbers that they will be able to walk into Australia in much the same 
way as Captain Cook did 150 years ago against the boomerangs and spears of the 
                                                 
238 Egon F. Kunz, Displaced Persons: Calwell’s New Australians (Sydney, Australia: Australian National 
University Press, 1988), 11. 
 94
Aborigines.”239 With a population of only seven million, it was impossible to protect 
Australia’s twelve thousand miles of coastline. To combat this, newly elected Prime 
Minister, J.B. Chifley established the Department of Immigration naming Arthur Calwell 
as the first Minister of Immigration of the Commonwealth of Australia on 13 July 1945. 
In his first address to the Australian House of Representatives on 2 August 1945, 
Calwell stated that Australians needed to overcome their xenophobic fear of foreigners 
and press hard for immigration if they were to succeed in a postwar world.240 He further 
argued that with their present economy, the nation could absorb up to 70,000 immigrants 
annually.241 Initial immigration focused on the recruitment of British subjects under the 
Free and Assisted Passage Scheme, resulting in the resettlement of over 170,000 ex-
servicemen and women from Britain by 1952.242 Though British immigrants provided 
Australia with its largest immigration numbers until the 1970s, by 1946, too few 
immigrants had responded to Australia’s offer forcing them to seek elsewhere to meet 
their immigration quotas.243  
Chifley was the first to realize the potential for immigration among the DP camps 
in Germany. In the summer of 1947, Chifley authorized Calwell to explore the possibility 
of establishing a European immigration scheme. As a result, the Immigration Office 
signed an agreement with the Preparatory Commission of the IRO on 21 July 1947. 
According to this agreement, Australia would initially accept four thousands DPs 
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(followed by one thousand per month) and agreed to pay ten pounds towards the passage 
of each immigrant. Calwell further promised that after their arrival, the DPs would “enjoy 
exactly the same living conditions and wages as Australian workers performing similar 
work.”244 He authorized Immigration officers to begin recruitment of 12,000 DPs before 
the Australian government even ratified the IRO agreement. Justifying his actions to 
Chifley, Calwell stated that the interest of securing DPs shown by other countries made 
the move “the most speedy and economical method of securing best types of migrants 
required for Australia’s economic rehabilitation.”245 Under the direction of Calwell and 
the head of the Australian Military Mission, recruitment began in the British occupational 
zone. 
Though Australian officials showed preference for single, unattached men and 
women, the immigrations scheme encouraged the recruitment of married breadwinners so 
long as they were physically fit and willing to work. Once in Australia, immigrants were 
encouraged to sponsor other relatives and friends for immigration. The IRO greatly 
appreciated what was essentially a family migration scheme and acknowledged Australia 
as a model for other governments.246 The most pressing immediate challenge to 
immigration was the securing of ships to transport the DPs from Europe to Australia. The 
greater challenge of preparing the xenophobic Australian population to accept the new 
arrivals still lay ahead. In 1946, after attending the International Labor Conference held 
in Paris, Australian representative, L.C. Haylen drew attention to the need to educate the 
                                                 
244 Commonwealth of Australia, “Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Preparatory 
Commission of the International Refugee Organization regarding the Migration to Australia of Refugees 
and Displaced Persons,” 21 July 1947, Australian Treaty Series, no. 3 (electronic), pt. 8. Australia was the 
only host country to grant the DPs full health and social benefits immediately upon their arrival. 
245 Kunz, 35 and Wendy Webster, “Transnational Journeys and Domestic Histories,” Journal of Social 
History 39, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 54-55. 
246 W.D. Borrie, Immigration, Australia’s Problems and Prospects (London, England: Angus and 
Robertson, Ltd., 1949), 28. 
 96
Australian public about the DPs and assure them that they posed no threat to their 
livelihoods. At the same time, Haylen warned that “the greatest danger to successful 
settlement of migrants in Australia is a tendency for them to group together in national 
units,” a tendency which proper introduction to Australian culture could help prevent.247 
The government launched a media campaign both at home and abroad to 
encourage immigration. The Immigration Advisory Committee recommended that if 
Australia “wants immigrants, Australia and Australians must do something vigorous 
about preparing to receive them.”248 The fear was that opposition from Australians to the 
influx of new migrant workers would make assimilation and acceptance of the DPs 
impossible. The Department of Immigration worked hard to shift the focus of labor 
unions and native Australian workers away from viewing the new immigrants as 
competition for resources, but rather as the means to increase the number of jobs and 
material goods available through an increase in consumer demand. The new arrivals, they 
further argued, would do Australia a favor by filling those occupations native Australians 
did not want.249 
Department of Immigration officials showed concern that the DPs not receive a 
view of Australia that showed the country and its people as anything less than true to life. 
They determined that information given to the DPs must be “strictly correct” and not aim 
to attract immigrants “by presenting a glamour picture of the Commonwealth.”250 The 
immigrants were to arrive with no delusions, knowing what to expect and eager to 
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assimilate. To this end, the Australian Information Office published a booklet for 
dispersal in the DP camps. Officials claimed that in simple language, the booklet gave a 
description of the historical and cultural values of Australia. This would help prepare 
them for the physical conditions of Australia as well as instill in them an appreciation for 
the native way of life.251 
Calwell, realizing the importance of first impressions of the Australian public to 
the success of the immigration scheme, ordered that recruiters allow only those DPs 
accepted under the strictest guidelines to immigrate. Calwell’s own impressions of the 
Baltic DPs (formed during his initial visit to the German camps), the Immigrant Advisory 
Board’s recommendation that they receive immigrant status, and the regard of other 
resettlement countries of them, made the Balts the ideal refugee.252 On 28 November 
1947, the former US warship, the General Stuart Heintzelman, arrived in Fremantle 
carrying 843 single men and women from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as Australia’s 
first DPs.253 The welcoming reception given to the new arrivals, coupled with the good 
impression these DPs made on those around them, convinced Calwell of the need to 
preserve their image as the ideal DP for future media campaigns.254 From that point on, 
Calwell, the media, and the public commonly referred to the DPs as 'Balts' regardless of 
their nationality. This fact would later annoy the resettled Baltic DPs who wondered how 
many years had to pass before they ceased being ‘Balts’ and became Australians.  
Immigration officials took the DPs by train to former military camps now 
designated as reception and training centers immediately upon their arrival. Calwell 
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selected these sites to segregate the DPs from the rest of the population and allow them 
time to adjust to their new homes. The largest center was at Bonegilla in Victoria, 
between the cities of Adelaide and Brisbane. Here, the new arrivals received “survival” 
training in the English language and Australian culture while waiting for Immigration 
officials to establish job placement and living arrangements. The entire process normally 
took four weeks. As part of the initial assimilation process, teachers with the 
Commonwealth Office of Education (COE) developed a scheme of “assimilation through 
education” focused on teaching English to the immigrants. The COE later developed 
radio programs in simple English so that the DPs could still learn after they left the 
reception centers.255 During this time, the DPs remained generally optimistic, as 
evidenced by positive messages sent to friends still in Germany as they waited in 
anticipation for their new lives to begin.256 
 Under the direction of the Department of Immigration, the Commonwealth 
Employment Service (CES) placed the refugees in jobs and arranged for their transport 
between the centers and the place of employment. Codified by the Department of 
Immigration in January 1948, the guidelines for job placement focused on one basic issue 
– that no immigrant should deprive an Australian of occupation or accommodation. The 
types of work considered suitable placed women in domestic service while sending the 
men to rural, often isolated areas as manual and industrial laborers.257 The purpose of the 
two year contract was to keep the DPs at undesirable occupations long enough to do 
some good for Australia and gain acceptance from Australians. The Department of 
                                                 
255 Lois Carrington, A Real Situation: the Story of Adult Migrant Education in Australia 1947-1970 
(Canberra, Australia: Lois Carrington, 1997), 2-3, 6. 
256 Kunz, 141. 
257 Ibid, 141-142. 
 99
Immigration carried out a concentrated media campaign to convince Australians that the 
DPs posed no threat to their personal livelihood.  According to historian Egon Kunz, they 
were to be “depicted as intelligent, educated, clean-cut and appreciative, not at all the 
feared foreigner . . . seen as cheerfully accepting the worst jobs, arriving in endless 
shiploads to man public utilities, break labor bottlenecks, and generally help the war-tired 
economy recover.”258 The Department of Immigration declared the media campaign a 
success among Australians, who proved willing to accept the immigrants on these terms. 
Complaints about the scheme focused on Calwell’s insistence that regardless of 
previous occupations or skill, the DPs remain in their places of initial employment for the 
full two years of their contract. In the case of Apalonia Sapalis, a famous Latvian singer 
placed to work as a kitchen maid, not even the plea of the chorus master of an opera 
company in Melbourne could persuade Calwell to relax his stance. “Australia has a 
right,” he argued, “to expect that these people – no matter what their skill or attributes – 
will give their services for a period of up to two years in some branch of the Australian 
economy in which labor is scarce.”259 The Department of Immigration launched a 
publicity campaign in magazines and newsletters portraying the DPs as more than happy 
to perform menial labor. Former lawyers, doctors, professors, and artists smiled 
cheerfully for the cameras while working at their new blue-collar jobs. The national 
media fired back with cartoons and stories portraying Calwell as unyielding to change 
even for the benefit of Australia.260  Little change occurred until the Commonwealth 
Department of Works and Housing, short of engineers, architects, and draftsmen, 
contacted the Department of Labour and National Services about recruiting from among 
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the DPs. To their pleasant surprise, the Baltic DPs especially showed a high 
concentration of professional training. After some political wrangling with the 
Department of Immigration, the Department of Labour and National Services finally 
passed a resolution on 11 August 1949 to the effect that recruitment from among the DPs 
was necessary for relieving the shortage of labor in certain professional occupations.261  
 Calwell’s media campaign proved quite successful among Australians; whether it 
was as successful among the DPs is a matter of some debate among historians, politicians, 
and the DPs themselves. A two part study, conducted by Jean Martin, Professor of 
Sociology at La Trobe University in Melbourne, provides the most comprehensive look 
at the social impact of the “New” Australians.262 Conducting interviews with the DPs, 
first in 1952 and again in 1962, Martin reveals the intense feelings of isolation 
experienced by the DPs after their arrival. The isolation of their jobs, occasional clashes 
with native workers, and for many the inability to understand English, all served to 
increase loneliness and make them feel further set apart. The ultimate goal for the DPs 
was financial security. To this end, they deprived themselves of luxuries, such as 
vacations, going to the movies, eating out, and buying “frivolous” goods, to raise enough 
capital to buy their own home and security.263 Martin recalls that some of the 
interviewees feared she was a Soviet spy and at first refused to speak with her; others, 
that she was an Immigration official who could help them improve their situation; still 
others simply saw her as a sympathetic ear in which they could confide. Re-interviewing 
the same DPs ten years later, Martin found that little had changed. Though more 
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comfortable living in Australia, the former Baltic DPs remained socially and mentally 
separate from Australians. 
 On the other side, there are numerous examples of DPs who came to accept and 
enjoy their new lives in Australia. In 1960, The Saturday Evening Post published an 
article about John and Ilsa Konrads, a brother and sister team of Olympic hopefuls and 
former Latvian DPs in Australia. The article talks at length about their family’s flight 
from the Soviets and the reasons for their eventual resettlement in Australia. The family 
chose resettlement in Australia over the United States, quoting the promise of “fresh, free 
and big, open country” and the desire to get away from countries “talking about and 
preparing for wars.”264 After fulfilling the terms of their work contract, the family saved 
money to purchase their own home and the father got work as a contract dental mechanic 
constructing dentures and other artificial dental work. By 1960, the family enjoyed a 
relatively successful middle class existence and their children fully assimilated into the 
Australian way of life. In essence, the Konrads were the ideal immigrant family 
conceived by Calwell in 1947.  
 On the other hand, the work of people like Jean Martin indicates the high degree 
of failure of the assimilation process. “At best,” stated an unknown DP, “Australians are 
kind to [DPs] as they are to animals. They want us to keep our place on the lowest rung 
of the social ladder.”265 The Baltic DPs felt themselves culturally superior to Australians. 
A land full of laborers and businessmen, they deemed Australia a land of low culture.266 
Desiring refinement, the Baltic immigrants promoted the rebuilding of cultural ties based 
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on nationality within the Australian community. In all, Australia resettled 182,159 DPs 
under the auspices of the IRO, second only to the United States.267 
 On the other side of the globe, postwar Canada faced similar population concerns. 
Even before the end of the Second World War, public pressure mounted against the 
Labour government, led by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, to find the means to 
maintain the booming wartime economy. The postwar solution involved the boosting of 
population numbers to ease the industrial labor shortage. Notoriously isolationist during 
the Depression years, the Canadian government and public found the benefits of 
importing migrant workers a difficult task. Canada soon succumbed to international 
pressure and accepted their responsibility as a member of the United Nations to take part 
in the resettlement of the DPs. Modeling their policies after those of Britain, Canada’s 
migrant worker schemes placed the Baltic DPs among the most desirable types of 
immigrants for Canada. 
 Depression era policies greatly restricted immigration to Canada, allowing in only 
those immigrants with enough capital to support themselves.268 Instituted in March 1931, 
the era’s most important piece of immigration legislation, Order in Council P.C. 695, 
permitted only the following categories for admission into Canada: British and American 
citizens able to financially maintain themselves while seeking employment; any farm 
laborer or individual working in industry with assured employment; and the wives and 
children of legal male residents in Canada. Because of these strict provisions, 
immigration plummeted from 1,116,000 in the 1920s to 140,000 in the 1930s. With 
nearly a quarter of the Canadian labor force unemployed in 1933, Canadians everywhere 
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took a dire view of immigrants. Deportations under the auspices of the Department of 
Immigration and Colonization occurred frequently if the immigrant was unemployed or a 
known social or political radical.269 
 During the Second World War, immigration was restricted even further. Adhering 
to P.C. 695, Canada refused to harbor asylum seekers including the Jewish passengers 
aboard SS St. Louis all of whom, on returning to Europe, perished in the Holocaust.270 In 
response to these restrictions, the Canadian National Committee on Refugees (CNCR), 
organized by the League of Nations tried to raise awareness of the European refugee 
situation in 1938.271 In spite of these attempts, the public remained largely hostile to 
immigrants. 
 As a major wartime industrial manufacturer, Canada’s economy placed it among 
the strongest in the world by the end of the war. Hope for a more liberal immigration 
policy grew when the postwar industrial boom fed a growing demand for skilled and 
unskilled labor which the Canadian labor force could not meet on its own.272 In spite of 
growing labor needs, King was slow to act. Citing the possibility of a postwar recession 
and the lack of ships available for transporting refugees to Canada, it would take two 
years for him to act on immigration.273 At this point, Canada was a major financial 
supporter of UNRRA and the UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and was well 
aware of the refugee situation in Europe. On 7 November 1946, King announced 
Canada’s intention to cooperate with international refugee organizations to provide 
emergency aid and assistance towards the resettlement of DPs and other European 
                                                 
269 Knowles, 115-116. 
270Ibid, 116. 
271 Danys, 69. This committee reorganized in 1943 to deal with all types of postwar refugees. 
272 Knowles, 125. 
273 Ibid, 126. 
 104
refugees. Speaking in Parliament, King stated that while its membership in the United 
Nations did not oblige Canada “to accept any number of refugees or displaced persons,” 
there remained “a moral obligation to assist in meeting the problem, and this obligation 
we are prepared to recognize.”274 
Pressured by the international community to accept at least a token share of DPs 
as immigrants, however, the Canadian Parliament revamped the Standing Committee on 
Immigration and Labour in 1946 to revisit the issue of immigration.275 According to 
historian Valerie Knowles, the committee’s first witness, A.L. Joliffe, director of the 
Immigration Branch, “made it quite clear that the government did not intend to reopen 
immigration offices in Europe until they brought the remaining Canadian servicemen and 
their dependents back to Canada.”276 Though the government acknowledged broader 
immigration policies as a concern, they would have to wait. 
 Many public figures, especially among the Canadian press, campaigned to raise 
awareness of the DPs’ situation in Europe in order to gain public sympathy and moral 
outrage for their plight. In favor of increased immigration, famous Canadian editor, B.K. 
Sandwell portrayed the plight of the refugees as “prisoners in a great, dark, airless room 
which [had] fifty different doors, the doors of admission to fifty different countries where 
they could build their lives afresh; but every door locked, barred, and bolted.”277 The 
obvious plea remained for Canada to give the refugees the chance to start again. 
 Opposition to proposed immigration came from all sides. Arthur Lower, well-
known Canadian historian of the time, and a staunch anti-Immigration advocate, derided 
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those who predicted the growth of population and immense benefit to Canada the 
allowance of immigrants on a mass scale would bring. Questioning the idea that 
immigration spurts of the past two centuries ever played a part in Canada’s economic 
growth, Lower warned that the DPs would hinder rather than aid population growth. Still 
active in his stance several years after immigration began, Lower wrote an article in 1949 
entitled “The Myth of Mass Immigration,” for Maclean’s Magazine. In it, he declared 
that “Despite the fact that you can hardly pick up a newspaper without being told Canada 
should bring in 500,000 immigrants a year, or that she should double her population in 
the next few years, I’m going to argue that mass immigration is both unwise and 
unpractical.”278 Immigrants, anti-Immigration advocates argued, threatened the 
livelihoods of native blue-collar workers by providing cheap labor for industry. Fear of 
another depression drove anti-Immigration campaigns to keep foreign labor at bay. 
 Pro-Immigration, however, called on the government’s need to act quickly to 
secure the best refugees for immigration. Competition among the host countries for 
immigrants from the DP camps pushed the CNCR to again lobby for increased 
immigration. They recommended that officials make a distinction between general 
immigrants and political refugees and the Displaced Persons, giving top priority to the 
latter. On 28 May 1946, the cabinet took its first step towards the development of a new 
immigration policy. The passage of P.C. 2071 allowed Canadian residents “who were 
capable of caring for them, to sponsor the admission of first-degree relatives in Europe 
plus orphaned nieces and nephews under sixteen years of age.”279 Broader individual 
sponsorship schemes soon followed. Religious sponsorship allowed churches and 
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ministries to sponsor displaced clergymen to come as pastors for churches throughout 
Canada. The Baptist Union of Western Canada, for example, sponsored Rudolf Eksteins, 
a Latvian Baptist minister, to immigrate with his family. According to his son, noted 
historian Modris Eksteins, his father’s first assignment “was to travel the farmlands of the 
West, visiting local churches and talking about the situation in Europe in an attempt to 
find sponsors for refugees.”280 
 After attending the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration Policy in 
December 1946, Harry Hereford of the Department of Labour, reported to deputy 
minister of the Canadian Department of Labour, Arthur MacNamara, the need to act 
quickly to secure the best of the DPs: “We might get some good people [from among the 
refugees] . . . particularly those from the Baltic States.”281 Once they decided in favor of 
refugee immigration, the Canadian government moved quickly and established a plan to 
accept DPs before reaching an international agreement. With Britain as the first host 
country to offer resettlement, Canada followed London’s example in developing its own 
immigration plans. As the chief architect of DP immigration policies, MacNamara 
oversaw and controlled nearly every aspect of the immigration schemes.282 In 1947, he 
received a full report of Britain’s migrant worker schemes, including their rate of success 
and failure.283  
 Rather than agreeing to a plan similar to Australia’s (based on recruiting for 
numbers rather than specific occupations), MacNamara proposed to secure DP women 
for domestic service, similar to Britain’s ‘Balt Cygnet,’ and a large-scale sponsorship 
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program to recruit DP men to fill specific requests filed by individual industries and 
factories throughout Canada. The only similarity to Australia’s scheme would be the 
encouragement of family immigration followed by later sponsorship of friends and 
relatives.284 Before officially recognizing the IRO agreement, Canada passed legislation 
on 6 June 1947 authorizing the initial entry of up to 5,000 sponsored displaced persons 
(subsequent orders raised this number to 45,000 refugees, plus any dependents).285 In 
addition, the list of admissible relatives of legal residents of Canada expanded to include 
spouses, parents, children and siblings, orphaned nephews and nieces under the age of 21, 
and fiancées.286 
 By late 1947, five mobile teams composed of medical, Immigration, security, and 
Labour personnel traveled to Germany to begin recruiting for immigration to Canada. 
According to Canadian diplomat, John W. Holmes, the government sent these “head 
hunters” to select the best from among the DPs “like good beef cattle, with preference for 
strong young men who could do manual labor and would not be encumbered by aging 
relatives.”287 Ethnic origin was a central part of Canada’s screening process. Relying on 
the favorable impressions of figures such as Vincent Massey, the High Commissioner in 
London, screening officials routinely rejected Jewish immigrants in favor of those from 
the Baltic and other parts of Eastern Europe.288  
 Other than the obvious preference shown for them by recruiters from other host 
countries, reasons why the Balts ranked so highly for Canadian immigration stemmed 
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largely from Canadians’ ignorance of who they were as a people and culture. Although 
IRO reports indicated a predominance of professionals among the Baltic DPs, Canadian 
officials seemed to regard them as illiterate, but polite, peasants.289 Since the Department 
of Labour discouraged the recruitment of well-educated professionals among the DPs, 
preferring “brawn over brains,” many of the Baltic DPs lied about their backgrounds on 
immigration applications in order to gain admission from recruiters.290 
 To speed up the process of selection and to make matters of transportation and 
expense easier to arrange, the Department of Labour finalized the Bulk Labour Scheme. 
According to this plan, individual industries (particularly mining and forestry) could 
request a specific number of DP immigrants from the Department of Labour to work for 
at least one year. The fact that these jobs were generally located in remote areas, or were 
otherwise unappealing to Canadian workers, made the scheme appear the best way to 
boost population while posing no threat to native workers.  C.D. Howe, Minister of 
Reconstruction and Supply, as well as acting Minister of Mines and Resources, processed 
the requests for both skilled and unskilled immigrant labor. According the Knowles, these 
included “craftsmen for the clothing industry, woodworkers, and men suitable for work in 
heavy industry, lumber camps, and construction, and people for domestic work in homes, 
hospitals and similar institutions.”291  
 Soon, however, opposition to the Scheme came from both Human Rights 
advocates, who claimed the plan lent itself to a form of semi-servitude that placed the 
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DPs completely under employers’ control. Indeed, the Canadian press reported numerous 
instances where industries treated immigrant workers no better than slave labor. The 
constant bad press caused concern among the public. In the House of Commons, Gladys 
Strum, a Saskatchewan schoolteacher, voiced her concern: “I do not think it improves our 
standing in the United Nations to have appearing in our daily papers reports which sound 
like descriptions of scenes from Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which reminds one of the old slave 
market where girls were put up to auction with someone looking at their muscles and 
someone else looking at their teeth.”292 Even Labor groups, such as the Co-Operative 
Commonwealth Federation, accused the scheme of undercutting wages and threatening to 
displace Canadian workers in favor of cheap labor.293 
 Nicknamed “Mr. Mac’s DPs,” the new immigrant workers began arriving in 1947 
at the Pier 21 processing facility in Halifax. Media attention surrounding their arrival 
meant to paint the DPs in a positive light. Pictures and articles depicted the arriving DPs 
as grateful recipients of Canadian generosity. As one Estonian immigrant, Ernests Kraulis, 
remembers, onlookers lined the pier to greet the DPs with open arms. Reporters wanted 
to conduct interviews and politicians wanted to shake their hands, all under the lights of 
news cameras.294 Their reception was a calculated effort by the media and the 
government to reassure the Canadian public that the DPs posed no threat to native 
workers.  
 For male DPs brought over by forestry companies like Spruce Falls Power and 
Paper Company in Northern Ontario, the trip from Germany to their new homes was one 
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long, seemingly endless journey. Almost immediately after landing, the Department of 
Labour transported the DPs to their new homes in the remote regions of Canada. For 
most men accommodation proved little better than the former prison and concentration 
camps they left behind in Germany, yet they noted that the quality and quantity of the 
food was considerably better. Although the remoteness of the work sites made 
assimilation difficult, there existed a high level of acceptance in industry for DPs 
amongst their Canadian peers. Worker unions, always looking for new members, proved 
especially accepting of the DPs.295 By the end of the year, the Department of Labour 
declared the choice of the Baltic DPs a success. Despite this cheerfulness, the pitfalls of 
the Bulk Labor Scheme soon caused problems for MacNamara. 
 Chief among these was the reneging on contracts, not by the DPs, but by 
Canada’s industrial sponsors. Forestry companies became notorious for dismissing DP 
workers before their contracts expired (most often due to the end of the cutting season) or 
refusing to accept them as workers altogether, often while they were in transit from 
Europe. The general solution was to send the DPs elsewhere to fulfill their contracts, 
most often to work in the mines. This drew protests from the DPs who argued that they 
signed their contracts in good faith believing they would be working outdoors, not 
underground in the hazardous mining conditions. MacNamara’s response to their protest 
was the clear implication that immigration to Canada was a privilege, not a right. In other 
words, the DPs should be grateful, not particular.296 
 Forestry was the most population occupation, although gold mining had the 
highest number of contracts and offered the highest wage to their workers. On the other 
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hand, the hazardous health and safety conditions in the mines made that work most 
unappealing. Living up to their promise of sending the DPs to occupations Canadian 
workers did not want, the Department of Labour sent contract laborers to fill the shortage. 
Though safety measures at the Pickle Down Mine proved so antiquated that even 
unionized Canadian workers refused to work there, the Department of Labour sent them 
forty Lithuanian workers whose forestry contracts had fallen through. By the end of the 
contract year, all but one of the workers quit.297 
 Department of Labour officials viewed domestic service as the most promising 
migrant worker scheme in terms of population absorption. Estimates placed the need for 
ten to fifteen thousand immigrants to work in sanatoriums, hospitals, and private 
households. Baltic women, because of their “tidy” and altogether “attractive” appearance, 
remained preferable to other nationalities among the DPs for these jobs. Ill treatment by 
numerous employers, however, soon caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the 
Baltic women. Elena Zubrys, a dentist from Lithuania, recalled her annoyance at doctors 
and nurses constantly approaching her and her friends, asking why they always sat 
together and did not speak English.298 Many of the women were dissatisfied with their 
positions and requested immediate transfers. Because these requests occurred on an 
individual basis and such transfers posed little threat to the system as a whole, it mattered 
little to MacNamara where the domestic DPs fulfilled their contractual year of service. 
He graciously made it policy that any DP domestic could transfer upon request.299 
 By 1950, however, Canada had to abandon the Bulk Labour Scheme in favor of 
one more liberal and open. U.S. President Truman’s passage of the Displaced Persons 
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Act in 1948, which opened America to the refugees, led to a quicker emptying of the DP 
camps in Germany. The increased competition with other host countries to secure the best 
of the DPs forced the Canadian government to act. The P.C. 2856 of 9 June 1950 
rescinded all former immigration legislation. The order gave preference to those 
immigrants from Britain, US, and France, while allowing for the admission of any 
European refugee of good health and reputation with the skills necessary for work in 
Canada.300 Labor shortages in certain technical occupations led the Department of 
Labour, to succeed in helping one third of professional DPs – mainly architects and 
engineers – to continue their careers, in spite of opposition from professional 
organizations in Canada.301 The medical profession, however, jealously remained closed
to professional DPs, citing incomparable training between Canadian and European 
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 Once they fulfilled the terms of their contract, the majority of the Baltic DPs 
moved to urban centers where they soon developed their own cultural communities. In
effort to re-establish their national identities within Canada, the Balts tried to portray 
themselves in the sincerest way to their Canadian neighbors. Appalled by what the
believed was an apparent lack of cultural refinement in Canada, the Estonian DPs 
established theatre groups, song festivals, and opera houses throughout their communities, 
inviting their Canadian neighbors to participate.302 As Mrs. Irene Lukosevicius explaine
“We had this idea that we had to be our country’s ambassadors, to tell people what our 
country really was [like] and how it was suffering. We felt a very strong responsibility
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represent our people and to represent them really well.”303 The Baltic DPs in Canada 
seemed determined to maintain their own identity, adjusting and refining it to face the 
ling, 
, the 
 
o and 
ith the Canadian population. Between 1946 and 1952, Canada 
 
                                                
reality of life in Canada.304 
 In need of able workers to fill labor shortages in key areas of industry and 
domestic service, both Australia and Canada established DP resettlement schemes. 
Among the nationalities represented in the DP camps, both countries showed preference 
for those from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For Australia, Calwell’s media campaign 
promoted the Baltic immigrants as the ideal DP – intelligent, of good appearance, wil
and grateful. Canada placed the Baltic DPs among their first choice for immigration 
based largely on the good opinion of other resettlement countries. To a much lesser 
extent, the presence of Baltic minorities, which had earlier already settled in Canada, 
provided a model for what Immigration officials could expect from the DPs. Overall
DPs enjoyed a greater level of cultural acceptance in Canada than in Australia. The 
presence of an already well established Baltic community in Canada eased the transition
for the new immigrants. Establishing cultural centers in the major cities of Toront
Montreal, the Baltic immigrants desired to visibly maintain their identities while 
establishing a connection w
accepted 163,984 DPs.305 
 In Australia, Arthur Calwell’s intense media campaign to gather support for 
immigration among native Australians often contradicted the push for quick assimilation
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amongst the DPs. Although Immigration officials encouraged the newly arrived DPs to
enter fully into Australian society, Calwell’s publicity campaigns continually set them 
apart by depicting their cultural differences. Continual reference to the them as ‘Balts’ 
and ‘New Australians’ annoyed many of the DPs who wondered when they would cease
being ‘new’ and simply be Australians. Weekend festivals and parades to showcase the 
national costume and colorful cultures of the DPs clashed strongly with Immigration’s 
demands that the DPs leave behind all traces of their past in order to fully assimilate. In 
essence, they could not leave their cultures behind although Australians told them they 
should. Both Australia and Canada based resettlement of the DPs within their countries 
on economic need as well as
 
 
 a moral obligation as members of the United Nations to aid 
 the rebuilding of Europe. in
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 The IRO closed the last remaining DP camps in 1952, leaving 174,000 refugees
deemed ‘unfit’ for resettlement to fend for themselves in Germany. The United States 
Displaced Persons Commission called the scheme “largely successful.” Politicians, such 
as the Texas State Labor Commissioner, could only remark, “I’m glad it’s over.”306
Allied victors considered their obligations to the DPs fulfilled. For good or ill, this 
marked the official end of the postwar refugee situation in Europe. Later that year, the 
United Nations replaced the IRO with the United Nations High Commission for Refug
a permanent entity established to deal specific
refugees in the troubled parts of the world.307 
 The political, cultural, and social upheaval following World War II created a new
and frightening world. The Yalta Agreement between Britain, the United States, and the
Soviet Union revealed the darker side of international politics. In most wars, the strong 
often decide the fates of the weak, regardless of peacetime principles. This reality struck 
a devastating blow to the Baltic DPs. Their hopes for the future centered on the belie
the democratic Allies would uphold the terms of the Atlantic Charter and their own 
principles of freedom and democracy. The revelations of Yalta, however, revealed that 
those nations on which they had built their hopes had
ce in the Pacific, halfway around the world. 
 
306 Richard Moorehead, “Many ‘Misplaced’: Official Cheers End of DP Flow,” Dallas Morning News, 21 
September 1952. 
307 Slatt, 276, 292. 
 116
As this study shows, nearly a million refugees from Eastern Europe refused to 
return to their Soviet-controlled countries. The refusal of these “un-repatriables” to r
home forced the Allies to deal with the moral repercussions of their wartime actions. I
not for growing Cold War sentiment, it is likely that the Allies would forcibly have
repatriated many more of the refugees. However, fear of growing Soviet influence i
Europe gave the United States and Britain the excuse needed to redefine the Yalta 
agreement.  Resettlement to various host countries became the only viable option, 
especially considering the Allied world’s desperate need for labor. Ultimately, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain accepted the greatest number of DPs 
immigrants and the Baltic DPs placed first among those sought for resettlement. They fi
the image of the ideal immigrant held by the main resettlement countries as well-
educated, white Europeans. Yet, the qualifications which made them so attractive were
often overlooked in terms of the occupations assigned t
eturn 
f 
 
n 
as 
t 
 
hem as new immigrants. 
 
om 
d 
 policy 
Professors became janitors, artists became domestic helpers, lawyers became farmers,
and former government officials became coal-miners.  
 The level of assimilation and acceptance experienced by the DPs varied fr
country to country. Evidence suggests that the Baltic DPs sent to those countries that 
promoted quick assimilation by placing the DPs in direct contact with the native 
population experienced greater levels of acceptance. Other factors that influenced the 
transition from immigrant to citizen focused on how a country’s ideals differentiate
between the two, whether along religious, cultural, or racial lines. In the United States, 
for example, the Baltic DPs found themselves in immediate and daily contact with 
American citizens, forced to learn the language and customs in order to fit in. This
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differed from Australia’s where the government segregated the DPs away from the nat
population in a mistaken attempt to ease their transition into society. Propaganda 
campaigns and educational programs in the DP camps and on the home fronts helped 
prepare the DPs and the natives, but inevitably, expectations of both p
ive 
arties often clashed 
 
ge 
 has prompted a new interest in collecting and 
reserv sed 
roviding 
 
with the reality. This frequently led to friction between the two groups although many 
DPs found quick acceptance and kindness from their new neighbors. 
 The lives and experiences of the DPs is an often overlooked part of post World
War II history. It is as if the refugees simply returned home once the war ended. The fact 
remains that nearly a million refugees refused to return home, fearing Soviet control, 
forcing the Allies to adhere to their principles of freedom and choice. The normal passa
of time as the participants slip into History
p ing their stories before they are lost. The past few years have seen an increa
interest in the immediate postwar period. 
 The DP situation in Europe represents the first time that the world powers 
recognized the plight of refugees as an international problem. Since 1952, the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees continues to provide aid and shelter to the 
estimated 30 million refugees throughout the world. DP camps are in operation in many 
war torn countries providing shelter, food, and medical care for these refugees. As after 
World War II, resettlement remains a contested issue among the leading countries of the 
world. The camps provide only a temporary solution to the refugee problem by p
the most basic needs for the refugees, but no chance to rebuild their lives and start again.
The debate over resettlement focuses on the extent of the moral obligations and 
responsibilities of stronger, wealthier nations towards those forced from their homes by 
 118
events beyond their control. The case of the Baltic DPs suggests that given time and
opportunity, resettlement provides a means for refugees to escape their situation and s
again. But the issue remains as to how far a nation should go to help the people of 
another, whether the promise of aid solves the problem or exacerbat
 
tart 
es it further. The 
mple fact is that refugees will continue to exist as long as there is war and conflict in the 
orld. They present a complex problem with no simple solution.    
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